

2025 Landmine Monitor Myanmar/Burma Country Report



Contains 2025 Cluster Munition Monitor Myanmar/Burma Country Report

LANDMINE & CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Peace agreements may be signed, and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor is the civil society initiative providing research for the ICBL-CMC. It has reported on the global landmine and cluster munition problems and solutions since 1999 and 2010 respectively.

It has become the monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions and is a pioneering example of civil society-based treaty verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations from around the world contribute to the Monitor's global research work. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about the issue it is monitoring in order to benefit the world as a whole. It is critical, but constructive in its documentation and analysis.

Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor is not a technical treaty verification system or a formal inspection regime. It complements the reporting requirements of countries which have ratified the treaty. Our reports seek to make transparent the state of the landmine crisis, and government policies or practices, in non-signatory states.

The Monitor also aims to promote and facilitate discussion within human society in order to reach the goal of ending the suffering caused by antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions, and establishing a landmine and cluster munition free world.

Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor Myanmar/Burma researcher for 2025 was Yeshua Moser-Puangsawan. This report contains information included up to October 2025, except for Casualties and Support which report on data from the last calendar year. The Monitor is grateful to all the organizations and individuals who provide information for this report each year, and acknowledge their contribution within the report.

We encourage contributions which provide accurate documentation on these issues. Please contact us at: burma@icblcmc.org. If you have corrections regarding the contents of this report please write: monitor@icblcmc.org

This country report is printed and disseminated by MineFreeMyanmar.info and PDF copies are available at the website.

Cover: Artwork from the 2025 nationwide all media art contest on the impact of landmines in Myanmar run by Mhyote Mine Kin Kwar Pyi Myanmar Credit: Mine Free Myanmar

Policy

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.¹

Myanmar continues to produce and use antipersonnel landmines, despite its previous expressions of interest in joining the Mine Ban Treaty and its vote in favor of an annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the treaty for the past few years. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Myanmar also produce and use antipersonnel mines, including improvised blast and fragmentation mines that are victim-activated. New mine use in Myanmar increased significantly in 2024–2025 according to media reports and casualty numbers (see section on Use).

The State Administrative Council was formed after a military coup on 1 February 2021, but reconstituted itself as the State Security and Peace Commission on 31 July 2025.² Parliamentarians that were elected in November 2020 formed an oppositional National Unity Government (NUG) from exile in April 2021.³ Neither contender for government in Myanmar took any steps during 2024 or the first half of 2025 to accede to the treaty.

Before the coup, Myanmar officials had expressed interest in the Mine Ban Treaty and support for its humanitarian provisions.⁴ Myanmar often stated that it was studying the treaty with a view to joining in the future.⁵ In November 2020, Myanmar stated that it was “attentively” following the work of the treaty, which it said plays “an important role in ending the human suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel land mines.”⁶

Myanmar did not participate in the 1996–1997 Ottawa Process that created the Mine Ban Treaty. It has participated as an observer at several meetings of the treaty.⁷ Since the Fourth Review Conference in 2019, it has attended all of the treaty’s annual meetings, most recently the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2023. Representatives from Myanmar’s Geneva mission also attended the treaty’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2024.

1. The military junta that previously ruled the country changed the name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989. Many ethnic groups in Myanmar, and several other countries, still refer to the country as Burma. In this report, some internal state and region names are given in their various forms as per local usage, for example, Karenni (Kayah) state. Since 2009, the Monitor has used township names according to those used by the United Nations (UN) Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU). For more information, see the [MIMU website](#).
2. The Provisional Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar was formed on 1 August 2021 by the State Administration Council (SAC), with the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, as its chair. Myanmar also rescinded the State of Emergency as part of its preparations for an election to be held in December 2025.
3. The National Unity Government (NUG) is composed of members of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, parliamentarians who were elected in November 2020 but prevented from taking office on 1 February 2021 by the military coup. The NUG also has representatives from some of Myanmar’s many ethnic minority groups. The NUG sanctioned the formation of anti-military militias within the country in May 2021, which are known as People’s Defence Forces (PDFs). Many anti-military militias, including some referred to as PDFs, are self-organized and their connections to the NUG may be tenuous.
4. In November 2019, Myanmar’s former Union Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, Win Myat Aye, stated, “Myanmar recognizes the importance of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention in putting an end to the suffering and human casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, in saving lives and in returning hope and human dignity. We also believe that universalization of the convention is vital in reducing humanitarian harms. [...] Building lasting peace is the most fundamental and important task in the process of stopping future use of anti-personnel mines.” [Statement of Myanmar](#), Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 26 November 2019.
5. [Myanmar Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.45](#), United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 6 November 2019, p. 1. This is virtually the same as its statement the previous year. Myanmar Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.53, UNGA First Committee, New York, 8 November 2018. See also, [Myanmar Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.40](#), UNGA First Committee, New York, 31 October 2017, pp. 18–19 and 29.
6. [Statement of Myanmar](#), Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 16 November 2020.
7. Myanmar previously attended Meetings of States Parties in 2003, 2006, 2011–2013, and 2020–2023. It did not participate in the Review Conferences held in 2004, 2009, or 2014. Myanmar participated in intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2013–2014, 2016, 2019, and 2021.

In December 2024, for the third time, Myanmar voted in favor of the key annual UNGA resolution promoting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁸ Between 1997 and 2021, Myanmar abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the treaty.⁹ Myanmar has not offered any explanation for its change of vote.

The civil society initiative Mine-Free Myanmar released a Burmese translation of *Landmine Monitor 2024* at a press conference in Bangkok, Thailand, in January 2025.¹⁰ Mine-Free Myanmar also displayed artwork by artists from mine-affected parts of Myanmar at the Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap, Cambodia, in November 2024.¹¹ In October 2024, the United Nations (UN) Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) produced an updated map of Myanmar's mine-affected areas and infographics detailing the impact of mines based on data provided by the Landmine Monitor.¹²

At the treaty's Fifth Review Conference in late 2024, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) condemned the new use of antipersonnel mines in Myanmar and called on all governments to strongly condemn this use.¹³

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

State-owned enterprise Myanmar Defense Products Industries, known as Ka Pa Sa, which operates under the Myanmar military, produces at least five types of antipersonnel landmine: MM1, MM2, MM3, MM5, and MM6.¹⁴ In 2019, photos emerged of antipersonnel mines whose markings indicate that they were produced by Myanmar Defense Products Industries (KaPaSa) in 2018.¹⁵

During 2025, NSAGs in Myanmar continued to publish photographs showing antipersonnel mines produced by the state that they had captured, seized, or recovered from frontline Myanmar Armed Forces units.¹⁶ Although large numbers of Ka Pa Sa mines continue to appear in the field, the Monitor does not know how frequently production runs occur but still considers Myanmar an active producer.

Myanmar is not known to have exported antipersonnel landmines.¹⁷ Myanmar previously imported or

8. [“Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,”](#) UNGA Resolution, 79/34, 2 December 2024.
9. In 1996, Myanmar voted in favor of a UNGA resolution calling on governments to pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. [United Nations \(UN\) Voting Data](#) for Myanmar's voting record on the annual resolution.
10. The Mine-Free Myanmar initiative was initially known as “Halt Mine Use in Burma/Myanmar.” See, [Mine-Free Myanmar website](#).
11. The exhibition featured artwork on the theme of “The impact of antipersonnel landmines on my community” from across Myanmar, including from Chin, Karen, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan states and the Tanintharyi and Yangon regions. The artwork included submissions in Burmese, Karen, and English. The competition was supported by a grant from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). See, Mine Free Myanmar, [“Art Competition: Impact of mines on my community,”](#) 15 December 2023.
12. MIMU, [“Townships with Suspected Landmine/ERW Contamination \(1999–2024\) and Landmine/ERW Casualties in Myanmar \(2023\),”](#) October 2024. MIMU reports that the infographic is one of their most requested products.
13. [Statement of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines \(ICBL\),](#) Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 24 November 2023.
14. The MM1 is modeled on the Chinese Type-59 stake-mounted fragmentation mine; the MM2 is similar to the Chinese Type-58 blast mine; the MM3 is a bounding fragmentation mine; the MM5 is a Claymore-type directional fragmentation mine; and the MM6 is a copy of the United States (US) M14 low metal content antipersonnel mine. Myanmar also produces the MM4 antivehicle mine.
15. In December 2019, a non-state armed group (NSAG) in Shan state published photographs showing MM2 antipersonnel mines with markings that indicate they were manufactured by Myanmar Defense Products Industries in 2018. The allegation and photographs were published on a Facebook page associated with the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS). See [Facebook post by Tai Freedom](#), 3 December 2019.
16. Mine Free Myanmar, [“More antipersonnel landmines captured by anti-military groups,”](#) 21 August 2025.
17. In 1999, Myanmar's representative to the UN stated that the country supported banning exports of antipersonnel mines. Yet, no formal moratorium or export ban has been proclaimed. See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2000: Toward a Mine-Free World* (New York: Human Rights Watch, August 2000), p. 469.

otherwise acquired and used antipersonnel mines manufactured in China, India, Italy, Russia or the former Soviet Union, and the United States (US).¹⁸

There is no publicly available information on the types or quantities of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by the Myanmar Armed Forces.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling by NSAGs

NSAGs in Myanmar have produced improvised blast and fragmentation antipersonnel mines that are victim-activated. Such improvised explosive devices are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, regardless of whether they were manufactured in a factory or improvised from locally available materials. Some NSAGs in Myanmar have also produced Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines, antivehicle mines, and antipersonnel mines equipped with antihandling devices.¹⁹

Since the February 2021 coup, numerous NSAGs also possess antipersonnel mines that they seized from the Myanmar Armed Forces and from other groups.²⁰ They have also removed landmines from mined areas for re-use and acquired them from the clandestine arms market.²¹

Use

Since publication of the first edition of Landmine Monitor in 1999, the Monitor continues to receive reports of Myanmar use of antipersonnel landmines, and this use appears to have significantly increased in 2024–2025. In this reporting period (mid-2024 to October 2025), the Monitor documented use of antipersonnel landmines by the Myanmar Armed Forces, by the People's Defence Forces (PDFs), some of which operate under the National Unity Government, and by various other NSAGs operating in Myanmar.

Use by the Myanmar Armed Forces

Myanmar's Armed Forces have regularly used antipersonnel mines since 1999 but increased their use as armed conflict escalated following the coup in February 2021. Since the coup, antipersonnel mines have primarily been used around military bases and outposts, but also around infrastructure such as mobile phone towers, extractive enterprises, and energy pipelines.²²

18. ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2004: [Toward a Mine-Free World](#) (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 2004), p. 938. The mines include Chinese Types-58, -59, -69, and -72A; Soviet POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, PMN-1, and PMD-6; US M14, M16A1, and M18; and Indian/British LTM-73 and LTM-76.

19. The Monitor received photographs from an anonymous source that purport to show an improvised antipersonnel mine factory in Demoso township, Karenni (Kayah) state set up by the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) in February 2023.

20. In 2023, 2024, and early 2025, multiple NSAGs seized or captured antipersonnel mines from the Myanmar Armed Forces in Chin, Kayah, Rakhine, and Shan states, and in the Magway, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi regions. Between January 2022 and September 2025, in a non-exhaustive survey of media reports and photographs, Mine Free Myanmar found more than 60 instances of mines being captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces, amounting to hundreds of antipersonnel mines of types MM1, MM2, MM5, and MM6. See, Mine-Free Myanmar, "[More antipersonnel landmines captured by anti-military groups](#)," 21 August 2025; Mine-Free Myanmar, "[More antipersonnel landmines seized by armed groups during first 3 months of 2024](#)," 1 June 2024; and Mine-Free Myanmar, "[Myanmar Armed Forces consistently using antipersonnel land mines over the past 18 months](#)," 6 September 2023.

21. Landmine Monitor 2009 identified the presence of US-made M26 bounding antipersonnel mines in Myanmar but could not identify the source or the user. See, [Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Toward a Mine-Free World](#) (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2009), p. 1,031.

22. In February 2025, in Ann township of Rakhine state, one youth was killed and another injured by a landmine near the base of a cellular phone tower. It is unknown when this tower may have been mined. Saw Shin May, "[Young Man Killed, Another Wounded After Treading on Landmine Near Tat Taung Town in Ann](#)," Narinjara News, 17 February 2025.

The Myanmar Armed Forces acknowledged to the Monitor in 2019 that they use antipersonnel mines in areas where they are under attack.²³

Photographs reviewed by the Monitor indicate that antipersonnel mines manufactured by Myanmar were captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces by NSAGs every month between January 2022 and August 2025 in virtually every part of the country, indicating extensive landmine use.²⁴ Myanmar Armed Forces were reported to have increased the destructive power of antipersonnel landmines by placing a mortar projectile underneath them.²⁵

However, attributing the new use of antipersonnel mines is made difficult by the complex conflict situation and the partisan nature of some media sources.²⁶

While many areas were already heavily contaminated by landmines, most of the casualties reported during 2024 and 2025 appear to be from antipersonnel mines recently emplaced given the increase in use since the military coup.²⁷ Numerous news reports state that people are impacted by antipersonnel landmines while undertaking ordinary activities such as foraging or travel near abandoned military bases.²⁸ There are also reports of people being injured by landmines while near checkpoints constructed by the military.²⁹ Some military outposts mark areas near them that they have mined.³⁰ Villagers have complained about denial of access to resources due to landmines laid by the military to counter armed opponents.³¹

On previous occasions, the Myanmar Armed Forces have also reportedly threatened that farmers would be required to pay for antipersonnel mines detonated by their livestock. On 1 January 2024, near Let We Det village, close to Buthidaung town in Rakhine state, Myanmar Army soldiers reportedly demanded 1.5 million kyats (US\$707) from an owner of a cow maimed by an antipersonnel mine. The owner could not

23. “In border areas, if the number of Tatmadaw [Myanmar Armed Forces] is small, they will lay mines around where they reside, but only if their numbers are small. Mines are also laid around infrastructure, such as microwave towers. If these are near villages, we warn them. If there is a Tatmadaw camp in an area controlled by an ethnic armed group where they are sniped at and harassed, they will lay mines around the camp.” Monitor meeting with U Min Htike Hein, Assistant Secretary, Union Minister Office for Defense, Myanmar Ministry of Defense, Naypyitaw, 5 July 2019.

24. Mine Free Myanmar, “[More antipersonnel landmines captured by anti-military groups](#),” 21 August 2025.

25. As the Myanmar Armed Forces withdrew from Thaug Salone village, Shan state, an MM6 mine—placed on top of the fuze and body of a mortar projectile—was reportedly emplaced by departing troops on a path behind the village medical clinic. It was later found by returnees. Free Burma Rangers, “[Doctors as Targets: Many Killed In Burma Army’s Attacks On Medical Facilities](#),” 21 June 2023; and email from David Eubanks, Free Burma Rangers, 5 September 2023.

26. Media and data sources tied to the military tend to publish incidents ascribed to anti-military groups. Media and data sources tied to ethnic armed groups or the NUG publish incidents ascribed to the Myanmar Armed Forces. Very few publish the same incidents.

27. This new use has mostly been reported by villagers injured in areas where it was previously safe to conduct their livelihoods. For example, in May 2025, in Toungup town, Rakhine state, an elderly couple was injured by a landmine while walking to their farm. In April 2025, in Man Kan village, Shan state, a father was killed and his son was injured by a landmine while looking for their cow near the village. In March 2025, near Nan San Khan village, Kayah state, a 40-year-old woman was severely injured by a landmine while collecting garlic in her field. Online database of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) citing Narinjara News, Kantarawaddy Times, and Shwe Phee Myay News Agency. See, [ACLED website](#).

28. Maung Sar Ga, “[Landmine victim dies, another civilian wounded in Taungup explosion](#),” Narinjara News, 1 July 2025. The article states that on different dates two people received serious injuries near a former military base of the Myanmar Armed Forces Operation Command No. 5 in Taungup township, and another near the former military installation of the 543rd Infantry Battalion in Kyauk Phyu township, both in Rakhine state.

29. See, for example, Human Rights Foundation of Monland, “[Man steps on a landmine and loses his leg in Tha Yet Chaung](#),” 14 March 2024.

30. “[Locals in junta-held Sittwe fear landmines planted by military](#),” Development Media Group (DMG), 18 May 2024; and Human Rights Foundation of Monland, “[Battalions Plant Landmines alongside Thanbyuzayat-Ye Highway: Danger created for plantation workers](#),” 8 January 2024.

31. “[Junta forces plant landmines in areas where residents have to rely for livelihood](#),” Narinjara News, 12 April 2024.

pay so the soldiers butchered the cow.³² On 16 May 2023, livestock owned by farmers in Pyint Taw village in Rathedaung township, Rakhine state, were killed by landmines planted by the Myanmar Army near their camp in Ma Nyin Taung village. Subsequently, Myanmar Army officials from the camp summoned villagers and warned that they would have to pay compensation if cattle stepped on mines and caused them to explode.³³

Atrocity crimes and forced labor in mined areas

The Monitor found evidence that, in 2025 and in previous years, the Myanmar Armed Forces forced civilians to serve as “guides” to walk in front of its units in mine-affected areas, effectively to detonate landmines. The military also required civilians to conduct forced labor in mine clearance. This is a grave violation of international humanitarian and human rights law.³⁴

In September 2025, five civilians were reportedly killed after being forced by the Myanmar Armed Forces to walk through a minefield in Pwintbyu township of Magway region.³⁵ In June 2025, a local human rights organization claimed that the use of civilians to clear mines was required by the Myanmar Armed Forces in Launglon, Dawei, Yebyu, and Thayetchaung townships of the Tanintharyi region.³⁶ In February 2025, two women from Myaing township, Magway region, who were forcibly taken by a military supply column, were killed after stepping on landmines.³⁷

In January 2025, Myanmar Armed Forces reportedly forced civilians in Chang U township, Sagaing region, to clear mines planted by an unknown armed group along the Monywa–Mandalay road, leading to one death and several injuries.³⁸ Previously, in July 2024, the Myanmar Army allegedly forced local villagers to walk in front of them as they cleared command-detonated mines placed by the local PDF on the Monywa–Mandalay road. The same report states that in June, the Myanmar Armed Forces also made villagers walk ahead of them while removing mines between Myay Hne village in Monywa township and Khin Mon village in Chaung-U township, Sagaing region.³⁹

On 6 June 2024, a group of locals from Ahr Lar Kat Pa village, Myinmu township in Sagaing region, were seized by the Myanmar Armed Forces, who forced them to clear landmines planted by local PDF troops near the Shwe Gu Gyi monastery. One villager died and two were severely injured by mines in the process.⁴⁰ On 2 June 2024, a Rohingya youth, who was forcibly conscripted by the military, escaped from the Thone Maing Border Guard Police in Maungdaw town, Rakhine state, and then was severely injured by a mine.⁴¹

32. In the incident, two Rohingya farmers had stepped on an antipersonnel mine, one received serious injuries, and the other farmer and the cow were mildly injured. Online database of ACLED. Exchange rate for 1 January 2024: MMK1,000=US\$0.4715. [Oanda](#).

33. “[Army warns that owners must pay if planted landmines are exploded by cattle](#),” Narinjara News, 7 June 2023.

34. For more than two decades, the Monitor has reported disturbing evidence that the Myanmar military has forced civilians to clear antipersonnel mines without training or protective equipment or forced them to guide or carry equipment for the military in mined areas. Such activities constitute a threat to the right to life, liberty, and security of person. See, Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Tenth Session, “[Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15\(c\) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1](#),” 18 October 2010.

35. “[Myanmar junta troops kill at least nine civilians, including human shields, in Magway Region](#),” Myanmar Now, 8 September 2025.

36. Myanmar Peace Monitor interview with Nai Aue Mon, [Director of the Human Rights Foundation of Monland](#), 11 June 2025.

37. The military column reportedly seized six civilians from Htan Bu Taw village, Myaing township, Magway region. Two other women were injured by a landmine explosion during the incident. “[Two Women Forced to Serve as Human Shields Killed by Landmines in Myaing Township](#),” Myanmar Press Photo Agency, 17 February 2025.

38. On 20 January 2025, between Ngar Shan and Gway Pin Taw in Chaung-U township, Sagaing region, a mine exploded, killing a man and injuring four other people after Myanmar military troops forced travelers on the Monywa–Mandalay road to clear mines planted by an unknown armed group. Online database of ACLED.

39. “[Myanmar junta troops use human shields to clear landmines on Monywa–Mandalay Road](#),” Mizzima, 7 July 2024.

40. Online database of ACLED.

41. Online database of ACLED.

Armed groups in northern Shan state have also reportedly seized villagers for forced labor as porters in mine-affected areas.⁴² Ethnic armed groups in Kachin state have also been reported to conscript forced labor in mine-affected areas.⁴³

Use on the Bangladesh border

The beginning of 2025 saw an increase in the number of mine victims along the border, driven in part by the movement of people attempting to resettle villages following armed conflict. This has led some Rohingya in the refugee camps to believe landmines have been laid to prevent their return.⁴⁴ As in previous years, cross-border cattle traders remained at high risk of landmine injuries and death as they crossed into Myanmar for their livelihood, as were others engaged in activities around the border.⁴⁵ The border area is heavily mined, but it is unclear how recently the mines were laid.

Previously, villagers attributed newly laid mines to Myanmar Army border patrols. As conflict shifted to southern Buthidaung in Rakhine state, the Myanmar Army also began laying new mines near the town, resulting in multiple casualties in 2024.⁴⁶

In May 2024, the Arakan Army (AA) took control of the Myanmar border with Bangladesh and created routes through border minefields, requiring that people pay in order to be guided across.⁴⁷ Through mid-2025, cattle smugglers continued to be killed or injured by landmines at this border.⁴⁸ In August 2024,

42. Naw Theresa, [“Myanmar Ethnic Armed Groups Draw Allegations of Forced Recruitment,”](#) The Diplomat, 3 January 2024.

43. Healthcare workers in Kachin State, where four different ethnic armed groups operate, state that internally displaced persons (IDPs) face forced recruitment as porters by the armed groups in the area. Back Pack Health Worker Team (BPHWT), “BPHWT 2024 Annual Report,” 3 June 2025, p. 17.

44. See, for example, Porimol Palma, Mohammad Jamil Khan, Mokammel Shuvo, [“Bangladesh-Myanmar border: Land mine-related injuries on the rise,”](#) The Daily Star, 18 August 2025. Most news regarding landmine casualties among the Rohingya are solely published in Bangladeshi newspapers.

45. A youth tending cattle was seriously injured by antipersonnel landmines near border pillar 48. See, S Bashu Das, [“Bangladeshi man’s leg severed as landmine explodes along Bandarban border,”](#) Dhaka Tribune, 3 February 2025. A Bangladeshi man was injured by an antipersonnel mine on the Myanmar side of the Bangladesh border after he had crossed to collect fire wood. See, [“Man loses leg as landmine explodes on Myanmar side of border,”](#) The Daily Star, 29 March 2025. A fisherman in the Naf river was seriously injured by an antipersonnel mine when he crossed to the Myanmar side. See, [“Bangladeshi fisherman loses leg in mine explosion along Myanmar border,”](#) New Age, 6 April 2025. A man smuggling cattle was injured by an antipersonnel landmine allegedly laid by the Arakan Army between border pillars 46–47. See, [“Bangladeshi man loses leg in landmine blast near Bandarban border,”](#) Dhaka Tribune, 8 April 2025. A 16-year-old boy from Maungdaw town stepped on a mine near the border fence at the Naf river. See, Naung Min Thu, [“Muslim youth lost leg due to mine in Maungdaw,”](#) Narinjara News, 3 May 2025. [A young woman was seriously injured by a landmine on the Myanmar side of the border when she went for a bath in a creek near border posts 42–43.](#) See, Khaing Lu Hla (Yoma Myay), “A young woman lost her leg due to a mine explosion at the Bengal-Rakhine border,” Narinjara, 8 August 2025.

46. On 1 January 2024, two Rohingya farmers stepped on an antipersonnel mine in Let We Det village tract on the west side of Buthidaung town in Buthidaung Township. One of them lost his right leg and the other received a minor injury. See, online database of ACLED. On 10 January 2024, a resident of Hpon Nyo Leik village of south Buthidaung, stepped on a mine at the foot of Kyauk Yant hill. It was allegedly laid by the 22nd Brigade of the Myanmar Army, which has a camp on the top of the hill. See, online database of ACLED.

47. As of May 2024, the Arakan Army (AA) guide anyone wishing to traverse the border if they pay tax to the AA soldiers controlling the border post. A Rohingya woman, who traveled from north Buthidaung for medical treatment, told the Monitor, “My brother and I paid 20,000MMK (10,000MMK each) [US\$9.42 (\$4.71)] to the AA office near the border. They gave us a pass for one month. The AA soldiers also took us to the border point. They showed us safe passage. We reached Lambochari of Naikongchari [in Bangladesh] easily.” Exchange rate for 31 May 2024: MMK1,000=US\$0.4708. [Oanda.](#)

48. On 4 May 2024, one cattle smuggler was seriously injured and two others lightly injured by a mine while crossing the border. They left the cattle behind. On the following day, they sent two other persons to bring the cattle, who also stepped on a mine. All five were treated in Cox’s Bazar Hospital. Information provided by informants to the Monitor. See also, S Bashu Das, [“Bangladeshi man’s leg severed as landmine explodes along Bandarban border,”](#) Dhaka Tribune, 3 February 2025; and [“Bangladeshi man loses leg in landmine blast near Bandarban border,”](#) Dhaka Tribune, 8 April 2025.

Rohingya villagers who were collecting forest products were injured by mines laid near an AA camp.⁴⁹

In July 2024, one person was killed and two others injured, all residents of Bangladesh, while foraging for crabs in the Naf river after having crossed the borderline dividing Bangladesh and Myanmar that cuts through the river. It is not clear who laid the mines.⁵⁰

Elephants and other animals have also been maimed by mines emplaced along this border.⁵¹

Use by non-state armed groups

Ethnic armed groups have engaged in conflict with the central authorities in Myanmar for decades and Landmine Monitor has documented mine use by such groups for more than 25 years. Several militias sanctioned by the Myanmar Armed Forces, including Pyusawhti, the People's Militia Forces (PMF), and the Border Guard Forces (BGF), act under the military's direction and sometimes independently.

Since the military coup in February 2021, more local anti-military resistance groups have been established, some of which identify as PDF. PDF groups often declare allegiance to the government in exile, the NUG.⁵² Local media often report the use of "landmines" by such groups. Many of these devices are command-detonated roadside bombs, but some are victim-activated landmines. The Myanmar military frequently claims civilians have been injured or killed by mines laid by anti-military groups.⁵³

Given the number and variety of NSAGs operating in Myanmar, it is often difficult to assign responsibility for use to a specific NSAG. Yet many have used mines since the Monitor started reporting in 1999.⁵⁴ The Monitor has reviewed the following incidents attributed to NSAGs in the second half of 2024 and through August 2025.

On 15 April 2025, in Salin township, Magway region, several soldiers were injured in a minefield emplaced by an anti-military group.⁵⁵ In November 2024, allegations emerged that the AA emplaced new mines on paths near the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar.⁵⁶

49. Residents of Kyar Nyo Pyin in Buthidaung Township believe landmines laid by the AA were responsible for injury and deaths in their village. They informed the Monitor that on 22 August 2024, seven Rohingya went to a hill to collect bamboo shoots and other vegetables. The hill had been occupied by the AA for the past four to five years. When they did not return by noon, their family went to find them. On the hill, two were found, one boy and one man. Both were badly injured by an antipersonnel mine and they had lost their eyes. As they were blind, they couldn't return. It is not known what became of the other five.

50. "[Rohingya man killed, 2 Injured in landmine explosion during crab harvest in Naf River](#)," The Business Standard, 8 July 2024.

51. "[Wild elephant's ankle blown off by Arakan Army landmine in Naikyangchhari](#)," BD Digest, 12 August 2025.

52. As of May 2023, the NUG claimed that there were over 300 PDF groups organized in 250 Townships across Myanmar. The exact figure is difficult to verify. See, "[The PDF has established 300 battalions and columns in 2 years](#)," People's Spring, 5 May 2023.

53. For example, authorities attributed an injury of a woman foraging in the forest to an NSAG. See, "[Innocent Civilian Injured After Stepping on Land Mine Planted by Terrorist Group in Hsihseng Township of Shan State](#)," Myanmar National News, 30 August 2025. See also, "[Innocent Civilian Injured After Stepping on Land Mine Planted by So-Called PDF Terrorist Group in Salin Township, Magway Region](#)," Myanmar National News, 13 July 2025. In January 2025, the Myanmar Police Force stated that a man was injured by a mine left by a PDF in Kyauktaga Township in Bago Region. See, "[Explosion near Zeegone Village injures local man in Kyauktaga](#)," Eleven News, 7 January 2025.

54. On 15 October 2015, eight ethnic armed groups signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government, committing to "end planting of mines" and "cooperate on the process of clearing all landmines." Since the February 2021 military coup, this commitment no longer appears to be operational.

55. On 15 April 2025, in Salin Township, Magway region, a military column from the IB-235 stepped on mines planted by the Peacock Brother Urban Guerrilla. Online database of ACLED.

56. "[Elderly man loses leg in landmine explosion near Bangladesh-Myanmar border](#)," Dhaka Tribune, 8 November 2024.

On 29 August 2024, one villager was injured and another died from landmines that locals said were laid by the PDF in Yay Pya village tract, Kyaukkyi township, Bago region.⁵⁷ In June 2025, use of antipersonnel mines by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army led to a civilian casualty in Hpa-an township in Kayin state.⁵⁸ In January 2025, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) laid mines along the Ler Kwel road in Hpapun township in Kayin state which resulted in the death of a Buddhist monk and injury of another. The KNLA had previously issued verbal warnings to local villagers.⁵⁹ Between April–June 2025, local villagers reported that mines had been laid in the area by the KNLA and the Karen National Defense Organization.⁶⁰

Inter-ethnic rivalry has also resulted in landmine use causing civilian casualties.⁶¹

An increasing number of incidents involving explosive devices planted on berms of roadways, and then triggered by motor scooters, were attributed to resistance groups. The devices were likely antipersonnel mines, as these incidents almost always involved injury rather than death.⁶²

The Monitor continued to record incidents in 2024 and early 2025 involving the use of victim-activated booby-traps or explosive devices in urban areas. Most mine victims were engaged in trash collection or searching rubbish for something to sell.⁶³

Unattributed new mine use

It is often difficult for local people to know which specific group in a conflict area may have laid the mine that caused an injury or death in their village due to the multiplicity of armed actors. Mines attributed to unknown armed groups were responsible for deaths and injuries in Kayin and Shan states, and in the Sagaing and Tanintharyi regions during the first half of 2025.⁶⁴

Due to the escalation of armed conflict throughout the country, explosive remnants of war (ERW) have increasingly been causing casualties—mostly children—who are injured while handling ordnance that is

57. Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), “KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2023–August 2024,” 22 September 2024.

58. KHRG, “KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2024 - August 2025,” 12 September 2025.

59. KHRG, “[Mu Traw District Short Update: A landmine explosion killed one monk and left another injured in Bu Tho Township \(January 2025\)](#),” 25 April 2025.

60. KHRG, “KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2024 - August 2025,” 12 September 2025. For personal security, villagers did not detail the exact communities in which the mines were laid.

61. Disputes between armed groups in Pa-O areas have involved deployment of antipersonnel mines. BPHWT, “BPHWT 2024 Annual Report,” 3 June 2025, p. 16. In 2024, the Monitor recorded an increase in civilian casualties in those areas.

62. The Monitor recorded 91 incidents in Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, and Thanintharyi regions, as well as in Chin, Mon, Kachin, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states.

63. The Monitor recorded at least 31 injuries or deaths among trash collectors or scavengers in towns in the Sagaing, Tanintharyi, and Yangon regions and in Shan state between January and December 2024.

64. For example, in August and September 2025, people were repeatedly injured by landmines laid near roadblocks created by felled trees. Villagers have said that they do not know if the mines at these roadblocks were laid by the military or an anti-military group as both were active in the area. See, “[Two Landmine Explosions Near Mayanchaung Village in Yebyu Township Leave One Child Dead](#),” Independent Mon News Agency, 4 September 2025. Between August and December 2024, armed conflict between the Myanmar Armed Forces and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) left some areas mine-affected causing civilian casualties. Villagers are unsure which group was responsible for the mine casualties. See, “[Displaced Civilians Risk Landmine Dangers While Working Near Conflict Zones](#),” Independent Mon News Agency, 6 January 2025. In May 2024, four children were killed and one injured by a landmine in Khawea village in Paletwa township, Chin state, that villagers said could have been laid by the AA, who currently have control of the area, or by the Myanmar Armed Forces, who were previously present. See, “[Landmine Blast in Paletwa Kills Four Children Instantly, Injures One](#),” Burma News International (BNI), 11 May 2024. The Monitor has recorded at least 95 antipersonnel mine or explosive remnants of war (ERW) incidents leading to civilian deaths and injuries between 1 January and 30 June 2025 for which no group claimed responsibility, or that were attributed to an unknown armed group.

left behind.⁶⁵

No armed group in recent years has banned the use of antipersonnel landmines by their combatants. In past years, some NSAGs in Myanmar unilaterally renounced antipersonnel mine use.⁶⁶ The Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) renounced mine use in 2007, and its armed wing, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), previously promised to refrain from mine use.⁶⁷ In June 2017, the TNLA denied allegations of new use of antipersonnel landmines.⁶⁸ In July 2022, the AA stated that it used solely command-detonated landmines, but gave no indication as to the status of antipersonnel mines that it had captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces.⁶⁹

ASSESSING THE IMPACT

Myanmar is heavily contaminated with landmines as a result of conflicts between the Myanmar Armed Forces and various non-state armed groups (NSAGs). According to United Nations (UN) reporting in 2024, the country is “littered with landmines.” Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) have also impeded opportunities for displaced persons to return to their places of origin.

The Monitor has reported high numbers of mine/ERW casualties for Myanmar every year since Monitor recording began in 1999. The Monitor recorded more than one thousand people killed or injured in 2023 and more than two thousand casualties in 2024. The surge in mine/ERW incidents in Myanmar has been driven by mine use and intensified conflict.

Myanmar has no national mine action authority, and international demining operators are not permitted to conduct clearance. While the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) encourages the conduct of systematic contamination surveys, mine clearance efforts by both the Myanmar Armed Forces and NSAGs in Myanmar remain minimal and uncoordinated.

The MA AoR also supports the coordination of risk education and victim assistance efforts. Survivors' access to assistance services was severely limited in 2024. Since the 2021 coup, access to healthcare and victim assistance in Myanmar has deteriorated sharply, compounded by ongoing conflict, mine/ERW contamination, and the loss of medical personnel. Health facilities have been damaged or destroyed, and survivors face limited access to medical care, rehabilitation, prosthetics, and psychosocial support, particularly in rural and conflict-affected areas. Humanitarian actors continued to provide targeted support, but capacity remained insufficient to meet the mounting needs.

Action points:

- Continue efforts towards permitting mine action operators to conduct land release activities in accordance with humanitarian principles and in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

65. For example, on 14 July 2024, a child was killed and another injured after they handled an unexploded mortar projectile that they found next to a road in Kaw Loo Der village tract, Hpapun township, Kayin state. KHRG, “KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2023 - August 2024,” 22 September 2024.

66. In the past, a few NSAGs and former NSAGs in Myanmar unilaterally renounced use of antipersonnel mines by signing the Deed of Commitment. The Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA) renounced use in 2006. The Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) and the National United Party of Arakan (NUPA), both now militarily defunct, renounced use in 2003. The Lahu Democratic Front (LDF), the Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLA), and the Pa-O People's Liberation Organization/Pa-O People's Liberation Army (PPLO/PPLA) renounced use in 2007. In June 2010, Geneva Call noted that the LDF and the PPLA had disbanded.


67. Since 2014, Geneva Call has been pursuing inquiries about allegations of mine use made against the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). See, Geneva Call, “[Burma/Myanmar: Geneva Call urges an end to mine use in northern Shan State](#),” 14 July 2016.

68. Amnesty International, “[All the Civilians Suffer: Conflict, Displacement and Abuse in Northern Myanmar](#),” 14 June 2017, p. 44.

69. “[Military-planted landmines causing civilian casualties in Arakan State: AA spokesman](#),” DMG, 11 July 2022.

- Strengthen systematic data collection and reporting on contamination and on survivors and persons with disabilities, including refugees and displaced populations, to inform victim assistance and inclusive humanitarian responses.
- Expand the availability of trained medical and rehabilitation personnel, restore damaged health infrastructure, and ensure safe and unimpeded access to services for mine/ERW survivors.
- Scale up mental health and psychosocial services, including specialized care for survivors of landmine/ERW injuries and other conflict-related trauma, including among displaced populations, to address increasing psychological and social impacts.

Casualties (as of the end of 2024)



Note: AP=antipersonnel; AV=antivehicle; ERW=explosive remnants of war.

Contamination (as of the end of 2024)

Type	Extent	Top 5 EO contaminated states
	Unknown but expected to be extensive	Sagaing: 34 of 37 townships (92%) Magway: 18 of 25 townships (72%) Rakhine: 15 of 17 townships (88%) Shan: 43 of 55 townships (78%) Bago: 22 of 28 townships (79%)
	Unknown	
	Unknown	

Note: EO=explosive ordnance.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT

Casualties

Myanmar has no official mechanism to collect data on mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties. The Monitor has collected data annually from multiple sources since 1999, however, reports gathered from available sources are unlikely to reflect the full extent of incidents and casualties.

In 2024, Myanmar recorded the highest number of new mine/ERW casualties globally, remaining the most affected country for the second consecutive year. Myanmar experienced a sharp rise in casualties, increasing to 2,029 in 2024 from 1,003 in 2023, and 545 in 2022.⁷⁰ In 2024, two-thirds of all casualties were recorded as being caused by antipersonnel mines (1,352 or 66%), and 86% of all casualties were civilians.

Since 1999 through the end of 2024, the Monitor has recorded a total of 9,206 casualties (1,540 killed, 7,532 injured, and 134 with an unknown survival outcome). The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Myanmar for all time is unknown.

Contamination

Landmine contamination

Since the first annual Landmine Monitor report was published in 1999, the Monitor has documented extensive use of antipersonnel landmines by the Myanmar Armed Forces and by various non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operating in Myanmar.

New mine use since the military coup in February 2021 has increased the extent of contamination. Mines continue to be laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces and NSAGs, including newly formed anti-coup resistance groups. As of October 2025, suspected mine/ERW contamination had been reported in 211 of 330 townships covering all states and regions. This represents a further increase from the 100 contaminated townships reported in 2020 and the 190 reported in 2023, with the largest annual increase occurring between 2020 and 2021, when 52 townships were recorded as newly affected.⁷¹ In 2024, the UN reported that Myanmar is “littered with landmines.”⁷²

Reports indicate that the Myanmar Armed Forces have frequently emplaced landmines in villages, near homes, and around public buildings such as churches.⁷³ Reports also indicate that antipersonnel mines have been laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces near mobile phone towers, copper mines, and oil and gas pipelines.⁷⁴

The expansion of mine/ERW contamination into residential areas has resulted in heightened risks for civilians. The increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the presence of unexploded ordnance in populated areas and near plantations close to active conflict zones have also presented new threats.⁷⁵

70. Monitor casualty dataset for Myanmar.

71. Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), “[Insights on Suspected Landmine/ERW Contamination \(1999–2025\) and Casualties \(2020–2024\)](#),” undated.

72. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) “[Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024: Addendum](#),” June 2024, p. 3.

73. Amnesty International, “[Myanmar: Military’s use of banned landmines in Kayah State amounts to war crimes](#),” 20 July 2022.

74. Marwaan Macan-Markar, “[Myanmar land mine danger grows as military rings Chinese assets](#),” Nikkei Asia, 3 July 2023.

75. Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) Myanmar, “[Strategy 2025–2026](#),” 13 December 2024, p.4; Independent Mon News Agency, “[Displaced Civilians Risk Landmine Dangers While Working Near Conflict Zones](#),” Independent Mon News Agency News, 7 January 2025; and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “[Myanmar Country Office Humanitarian Situation Report No. 6](#),” 18 August 2024, p. 3.

Other types of contamination

The extent of ERW contamination is also not known. Reports indicate that ERW from both current and past conflicts—including ordnance dating back to World War II—continue to cause casualties in Myanmar.⁷⁶

Obligations to Relevant Conventions

Myanmar ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 7 December 2011 and has victim assistance obligations and commitments under the convention.⁷⁷ Myanmar is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty or the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Myanmar has also not joined the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) or its Protocol V on ERW.

ADDRESSING THE IMPACT**Land Release**

Most mine action coordination mechanisms in Myanmar have been suspended since the February 2021 military coup, with demining operations remaining prohibited for non-state agencies.⁷⁸

The Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) was therefore activated in 2022 to address the need for renewed coordination. It encourages the undertaking of systematic contamination surveys and aims to strengthen data management by accurately mapping landmine and explosive ordnance (EO) affected areas, improving evidence-based decision-making, supporting risk education efforts, and more broadly preparing for future demining operations.⁷⁹

The Myanmar Armed Forces reported that, between 2015 and 2025, they conducted demining operations in Kachin, Kayin, Northern Shan, and Rakhine states.⁸⁰ However, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that mine clearance efforts in Myanmar remain minimal and uncoordinated. Local demining—including attempts at clearing contaminated land with rented vehicles equipped with backhoe attachments—was reported by some villagers.⁸¹ According to HRW, military units have increasingly forced villagers, including children, to serve as “human minesweepers,” by compelling them to walk ahead of troops in order to trigger explosive devices.⁸²

Reports emerged in 2023 that anti-junta Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) units were being assigned to clear land after State Administration Council (SAC) forces were forced out of an area. KNDF soldiers have reportedly been clearing undergrowth manually, to detect mines without the use of metal

76. MA AoR Myanmar, “[Strategy 2025–2026](#),” 13 December 2024, p. 4; UNICEF, “[Myanmar Landmine and Explosive Ordnance Incidents Information: Factsheet January to June 2025](#),” October 2025; Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), “[Statement on International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action](#),” 4 April 2025; Phadu Tun Aung, “[One woman dead and nine others injured after bomb explodes in Minbya](#),” Myanmar Now, 12 January 2021; and “[Unexploded WWII bombs discovered at central Myanmar sports ground](#),” Coconuts Yangon, 30 September 2015.

77. United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, “[Ratification Status for Myanmar](#),” undated.

78. MA AoR Myanmar, “[Strategy 2025–2026](#),” 13 December 2024, p. 3.

79. MA AoR Myanmar, “[Strategy 2025–2026](#),” 13 December 2024, p. 7.

80. Presentation by Myanmar, “Mine Action in Myanmar,” Regional Seminar on Mine Action in the Langcang-Mekong, Siem Reap, Cambodia, 27–29 October 2025, p. 24.

81. Human Rights Watch (HRW), “[Myanmar: Surging Landmine Use Claims Lives, Livelihoods](#),” 20 November 2024. See also, “[AA clears junta planted landmines in Kyaukphyu](#)” Narinjara News, 12 March 2024. The All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF) also reportedly removed landmines from a captured police station in Gangaw Township, Magway Region. “[Junta forces booby trap Gangaw Township police station with mines](#)” Mizzima, 8 November 2023. The Chin National Front stated it had removed landmines at the India-Myanmar border in Rikhawdar, Falam Township of Chin State. Myanmar Peace Monitor, “[An interview with Salai Htet Ni, spokesperson for the Chin National Front/Chin National Army \(CNF/CNA\)](#),” 23 November 2023.

82. Human Rights Watch (HRW), “[Myanmar: Surging Landmine Use Claims Lives, Livelihoods](#),” 20 November 2024.

detectors. The priority for demining has been to make agricultural areas available.⁸³

Some NSAGs have been removing junta-laid mines from farms and fields and collecting them to stock for re-use.⁸⁴

Risk education

Risk education is coordinated by the MA AoR, which is led by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). In 2023, the MA AoR in Myanmar undertook initiatives to enhance collaboration with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG), the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), and the Myanmar Humanitarian Fund (MHF). In response to the sharp rise in mine/ERW casualties, the ICCG continued mainstreaming risk education activities across the entire cluster system, including in 2024 and 2025. These efforts were reported to have contributed to increased geographic coverage and overall impact of risk education activities, which reached 426,000 of the 5.6 million people in need of mine action services in 2024.⁸⁵

Target groups for risk education

As armed conflicts continue to spread across the country, the target groups of risk education sessions have remained broad, reaching farmers, people engaged in forest-related activities, scrap metal collectors, and other vulnerable people in communities located in active conflict areas and townships known to be contaminated. A special focus has also been placed on reaching children, as well as internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁸⁶

Delivery methods of risk education

Risk education has been provided both as a standalone activity and in conjunction with other activities, such as contamination surveys, victim assistance, and broader humanitarian response initiatives, including integration into emergency preparedness plans. Despite access constraints, mine action (MA) operators and other actors delivered critical safety information through various channels in 2024. These included face-to-face sessions provided by humanitarian actors, community volunteers, trained teachers, and civil society organizations, as well as digital means like social media, mobile apps, and entertainment tools such as games to enhance children's engagement in risk education activities.⁸⁷

Management and Coordination

Legislation and standards

Myanmar does not have specific mine action legislation or national standards in place. However, in October 2025, Myanmar reported that the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) had been translated into Burmese in support of establishing a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and the development of the

83. "Myanmar's landmine clearers working with pliers and bare hands," Myanmar Now, 1 September 2023.

84. HRW, "Myanmar: Surging Landmine Use Claims Lives, Livelihoods," 20 November 2024.

85. UNICEF, "Myanmar: Humanitarian Situation Report (End of Year 2023)," 14 February 2024, p. 4; UNOCHA, "Myanmar: Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024, Year-end Dashboard (Jan–Dec 2024)," 17 February 2025, pp. 1 and 3; UNOCHA, "Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025," December 2024, p. 40; and UNOCHA, "Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024," December 2023, p. 39.

86. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Walsh, Head of Humanitarian Response and Mine Action (HRMA), Danish Refugee Council, 5 August 2025; UNOCHA, "Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024," December 2023, p. 50; and UNICEF, "Myanmar Country Office Humanitarian Situation Report No. 4," 17 June 2024, p. 4.

87. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Walsh, Head of HRMA, Danish Refugee Council, 5 August 2025; UNOCHA, "Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025," December 2024, p. 55; Humanity & Inclusion (HI), "Myanmar," undated; The HALO Trust, "Myanmar," undated; Mines Advisory Group (MAG), "Summative Evaluation: MAG's Humanitarian Mine Action Multi-Country Programme 2022–2025 funded by the Government of Norway," August 2025, p. 32.

Myanmar National Mine Action Standards (MNMAS), which were said to have already been drafted.⁸⁸ Currently, national mine action efforts—including demining efforts and participation in risk education working groups—are organized under the National Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC).⁸⁹

Strategies and policies

In December 2024, the MA AoR released a strategy for the years 2025 and 2026 focusing on four core objectives that aim to strengthen risk awareness, improve coordination of mine-action efforts, ensure comprehensive support for landmine and ERW survivors, and advocate to reduce and ultimately end the use and impact of landmines and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IED) on civilians.⁹⁰

Information management

While the Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) provides some information related to mine action in terms of casualty numbers and contamination levels, Myanmar does not currently have a national mine action database.⁹¹ However, among the goals of the Mine Action AoR for 2025 and 2026 are the establishment of an Information Management (IM) department able to streamline data collection, analysis, and sharing processes, and the development of a centralized database for mine action data.⁹²

Victim assistance

Since the military seized power in February 2021, access to healthcare and related human rights have continued to decline.⁹³ The human security situation in Myanmar continued to deteriorate in 2025 due to escalating conflict, climate-related shocks, public health emergencies, and widespread contamination by landmines and other explosive ordnance.⁹⁴

Ongoing armed conflict in Myanmar has placed additional strain on healthcare services, while some health facilities have been damaged or destroyed.⁹⁵ With mine/ERW casualties rising, the capacity to meet the growing needs of survivors for medical care, rehabilitation services, socio-economic support, and psychological assistance remains insufficient, especially in rural areas. The political situation and conflicts have also stopped progress in the implementation of policies and activities for the rights of persons with disabilities. Access to services and support has further been hindered by the reported tendency of the military to label landmine survivors as members of the armed resistance, despite the predominantly civilian impact, creating additional fear among those seeking assistance.⁹⁶

88. Presentation by Myanmar, “Mine Action in Myanmar,” Regional Seminar on Mine Action in the Langcang-Mekong, 27–29 October 2025, Siem Reap Cambodia, pp. 12 and 14.

89. Presentation by Myanmar, “Mine Action in Myanmar,” Regional Seminar on Mine Action in the Langcang-Mekong, 27–29 October 2025, Siem Reap Cambodia, p. 9.

90. MA AoR Myanmar, “[Strategy 2025–2026](#),” 13 December 2024, pp. 6–9.

91. MIMU, “[About the MIMU](#),” undated.

92. MA AoR Myanmar, “[Strategy 2025–2026](#),” 13 December 2024, p. 7.

93. Fabio Saini, “[Myanmar’s Military Regime Has Weaponized Public Health](#),” The Irrawaddy, 6 November 2021; Global Health Partnerships, “[Three years on from the military coup in Myanmar health workers are still being targeted](#),” 1 February 2024; and Rohini J. Haar, Katerina Crawford, Larissa Fast, Than Htut Win, Leonard Rubenstein, Karl Blanchet, Louis Lillywhite, Nicholas Tint-Zaw, and Myo-Myo Mon, “[‘I will take part in the revolution with our people’: a qualitative study of health care workers’ experiences of violence and resistance after the 2021 Myanmar coup d’état](#),” Conflict and Health, 20 August 2024.

94. UNICEF, [Humanitarian Situation Report No. 10 \(January–December 2024\)](#), 21 February 2025.

95. Insecurity Insight and Safeguarding Health in Conflict (SHCC), “[Myanmar: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict 2022](#),” 12 July 2023; and Insecurity Insight, “[Attacks on Health Care in Myanmar: 23 July–05 August 2025](#),” 15 August 2025.

96. Tual Sawm Khai, Minhaz Farid Ahmed, and Muhammad Asaduzzaman, “[Examining the Vulnerability of Persons with Disabilities in Myanmar Pre and Post-COVID-19 and Military Coup](#),” Disability & Society, 2 June 2024; Vibhu Mishra, “[Children and amputees bear brunt of Myanmar’s deadly landmine epidemic](#),” UN News, 22 November 2024; and Insight Myanmar, “[Episode #374: It Takes All Of Us](#),” 3 August 2025.

Medical care and rehabilitation

Myanmar has few physicians trained in emergency medicine. Rural areas often lack emergency health workers and ambulance services, while healthcare centers in major cities lack adequate emergency response capacity. New legislation and arbitrary restrictions under the junta have impeded the work of voluntary aid groups, compromising support for mine/ERW victims in Myanmar.⁹⁷

Access to health services remain severely constrained due to significant losses within the healthcare workforce, continued out-migration of medical personnel, persistent shortages and high costs of essential medicines and vaccines, limitations on access to conflict-affected areas, and repeated attacks on healthcare facilities.⁹⁸ Insecurity Insight recorded incidents involving violence against, or obstruction of, healthcare services in Myanmar from the outset of the military coup on 1 February 2021 through early July 2025. Health facilities sustained damage or destruction in 407 instances, while 155 health workers were killed and 886 detained. Nearly three-quarters of these incidents were attributed to state armed forces.⁹⁹

Local health workers and community groups have continued to provide ad-hoc emergency support in conflict-affected areas, including in locations where formal assistance could not be delivered. Reports noted that survivors have frequently faced reduced mobility, had limited access to prosthetics and physiotherapy, and lost livelihoods.¹⁰⁰ Participation of medical personnel in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) has left the public health system understaffed and private hospitals overwhelmed.¹⁰¹ Health systems in some conflict-affected areas have also been disrupted, and medical workers continue to face attacks, arrests, and other reprisals, particularly if involved in the CDM or are suspected of assisting opposition forces.¹⁰²

United Nations (UN) experts stated, in a press release endorsed by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, that the SAC blocked mine/ERW victims' access to medical care and prosthetics. The experts noted that "this is absolutely contrary to Article 11 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and UN Security Council Resolution No. 2475" on protecting persons with disabilities in war.¹⁰³ According to the UN, not only has the supply of prosthetics been blocked by the SAC, mine/ERW victims are being forced into hiding because they face harassment and arrest. The SAC reportedly associates the physical injuries of mine/ERW victims, such as loss of limbs, with resistance activity.¹⁰⁴ The demand for rehabilitation services and assistive devices is particularly high among populations displaced by armed conflict, who are often affected by the junta's attacks in multiple, compounded ways.¹⁰⁵ As of 2025, prosthetic centers in Mandalay, Mawlamyine, and Loikaw were not operating.¹⁰⁶

97. [“No remedy”: A broken public health system fosters neglect and corruption](#), Frontier Myanmar, 8 August 2023; and [“Junta tightens its grip on charities helping the dead and dying](#),” Frontier Myanmar, 7 January 2023.

98. World Health Organization (WHO), [“Myanmar: Public Health Situation Analysis: Myanmar Conflict and humanitarian crisis](#),” 19 December 2024, p.11.

99. Insecurity Insight, [“Attacks on Health Care in Myanmar: 23 July-05 August 2025](#),” 15 August 2025.

100. [“Myanmar jungle medics face landmine crisis in liberated zones](#),” ABC News, 1 February 2025; and Human Rights Watch, [“Myanmar: Surging landmine use claims lives, livelihoods](#),” 20 November 2024.

101. A civil disobedience movement, initiated primarily by healthcare workers and civil servants, was launched immediately following the military takeover, and quickly spread to other sectors throughout the country. Although there have been many aspects to the movement, one key element has been the refusal to work for and cooperate with the military junta.

102. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), [“DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar 7 April 2025](#),” p. 8; and [“Anti-coup medical workers under attack while tackling Myanmar’s health care gap](#),” Radio Free Asia, 24 March 2025.

103. The experts quoted were Tom Andrews, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, and Heba Hagrass, Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) press release, [“Myanmar amputees under siege by junta landmines, harassment and blockades of prosthetics, say UN experts](#),” 22 November 2024.

104. Vibhu Mishra, [“Children and amputees bear brunt of Myanmar’s deadly landmine epidemic](#),” UN News, 22 November 2024.

105. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, [The Hidden Crisis: Disability Rights in Post-Coup Myanmar](#) (Conference Room Paper, A/HRC/61/CRP.1), 13 November 2025,

106. MIMU and Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, [“Facilities Supporting Treatment of Civilian Mine Victims 2008 - 2024](#),” 15 February 2025.

In November 2024, the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC), in collaboration with Myanmar's Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement and the Ministry of Health, held a National Consultation Workshop in Naypyitaw, focusing on the physical rehabilitation and mental health needs of victims.¹⁰⁷

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supported hospitals and health facilities, including those run by ethnic health organizations in Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan states.¹⁰⁸ In 2024, the ICRC prioritized emergency response and provided ad hoc support to more hospitals than originally planned, while delivering regular support to fewer than anticipated. It supported 20 hospitals, six of which were provided regular support.¹⁰⁹

The ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP) continued to support six physical rehabilitation centers. Due to a continued shortage of qualified rehabilitation personnel, the ICRC maintained a substitutive role by directly delivering services, while also investing in training initiatives in prosthetics and physiotherapy.¹¹⁰ The Leprosy Mission Myanmar (TLMM) provided prosthesis and care for people with disabilities, including those caused by landmines and other injuries.¹¹¹

Humanity & Inclusion (HI) provided rehabilitation services including physiotherapy, assistive devices, and mental health and psychosocial support.¹¹²

Many refugees have sustained injuries resulting in long-term impairment, indicating that disability rates among refugees are likely higher than in the general population. Data on persons with disabilities within refugee communities remains limited, creating gaps that hinder effective humanitarian programming.¹¹³

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

The ICRC organized sports activities and also facilitated livelihood activities and vocational training in 2024.¹¹⁴

No national figures on mental health have been released since 2020.¹¹⁵ Health Cluster Myanmar reported a significant shortage of mental health specialists, in the face of rising mental health needs linked to ongoing psychological stress.¹¹⁶

Legal frameworks or policies on disability inclusion

Under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Law (2015), persons with disabilities in Myanmar are entitled to formal equal rights and access to opportunities.¹¹⁷ However, decades of landmine use by the Myanmar military and other armed groups have resulted in widespread disability across the country, while persons with disabilities in rural areas and conflict-affected zones have faced significant challenges in accessing services. These barriers increased since the coup, as travel to major cities has become impossible

107. ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC), "[National Consultation Workshop on Physical Rehabilitation and Mental Health Needs Support for Explosive Ordnance \(EO\) Victims in Myanmar](#)," 22 October 2024.

108. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "[Annual Report 2023, Volume 2](#)," June 2024, pp. 284–285.

109. ICRC, "[Annual Report 2024](#)," June 2025, p. 242.

110. ICRC, "[Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report](#)," July 2025, p. 32.

111. The Leprosy Mission, "[Mobile prosthetics unit in Myanmar](#)," undated.

112. HI, "[Countries we work in: Myanmar](#)," undated; and HI, "[Country card: Myanmar 2023](#)," updated September 2023.

113. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, [The Hidden Crisis: Disability Rights in Post-Coup Myanmar](#) (Conference Room Paper, A/HRC/61/CRP.1), 13 November 2025, p.36.

114. ICRC, "[Annual Report 2024](#)," June 2025, p. 243.

115. WHO, "[Myanmar: Public Health Situation Analysis: Myanmar Conflict and humanitarian crisis](#)," 19 December 2024, p.9.

116. Health Cluster Myanmar, "[Myanmar Health Cluster Bulletin, January 2025](#)," 31 January 2025,

117. "[People with disabilities call for more legal protections, employment opportunities](#)," Development Media Group (DMG), 3 December 2022.

for many people living in opposition-controlled areas.¹¹⁸

The MA AoR in Myanmar, led by UNICEF, supports the coordination of risk education and victim assistance efforts.¹¹⁹ Risk education efforts prioritized camps for IDPs, villages with reports of widespread contamination, and active conflict zones.¹²⁰

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Casualties

Monitor casualty dataset for Myanmar.

Contamination

Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), “Insights on Suspected Landmine/ERW Contamination (1999–2025) and Casualties (2020–2024),” undated; Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) Myanmar, “Strategy 2025–2026,” 13 December 2024, p. 4; Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Landmine Monitor Myanmar/Burma Country Report December 2024,” December 2024, p. 15; and Cluster Munition Coalition, Cluster Munition Monitor 2025 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2025), pp. 19-20.

Support for Mine Action

In 2024, eight donors contributed US\$5.7 million to Myanmar for mine action activities. This represents a 72% increase from the total contribution of \$3.3 million provided in 2023.

International contributions went toward survey, risk education, and victim assistance implemented by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Funds were also provided through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) administered Myanmar Humanitarian Fund.¹²¹ In 2024, risk education became a mandatory requirement for accessing the Myanmar Humanitarian Fund, in recognition of the widespread contamination and related protection needs.¹²²

118. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, [The Hidden Crisis: Disability Rights in Post-Coup Myanmar](#) (Conference Room Paper, A/HRC/61/CRP.1), 13 November 2025.

119. UNICEF, [“Myanmar Country Office: Humanitarian Situation Report No. 4,”](#) 31 May 2022, p. 4; and MA AoR Myanmar, [“Strategy 2025–2026,”](#) 13 December 2024.

120. UNOCHA, [“Humanitarian Response Plan, Myanmar: End-Year Report 2022,”](#) 11 April 2023

121. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), [“Where we work: Myanmar: Myanmar Humanitarian Fund,”](#) undated.

122. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), [“EORE Sector Mapping and Needs Analysis,”](#) October 2024, p. 23.

International contributions: 2024¹²³

Donor	Sector	Amount (national currency)	Amount (US\$)
New Zealand	Survey, risk education, victim assistance	NZ\$3,300,000	1,996,500
South Korea	Risk education	N/R	900,000
Japan	Risk education, victim assistance	¥92,129,075	608,293
United Kingdom	Risk education	£529,423	676,656
Luxembourg	Risk education, victim assistance	€544,600	589,257
Switzerland	Advocacy, risk education, victim assistance	CHF400,847	455,094
Norway	Survey, risk education	NOK4,000,000	371,837
Sweden	Risk education	SEK758,800	71,758
Total	-	N/A	5,669,395

Note: N/R=not reported.

Five-year support for mine action

Since 2020, international mine action assistance to Myanmar has totaled \$24.3 million, representing an average of almost \$5 million per year.

Summary of international contributions: 2020–2024¹²⁴

Year	International contributions (US\$)	% change from previous year (US\$)
2024	5,669,395	+72%
2023	3,297,670	-36%
2022	5,134,970	-16%
2021	6,100,000	+48%
2020	4,118,868	-34%
Total	24,320,903	N/A

Note: N/A=not applicable.

123. Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Tim Reding, Chargé de Mission, Security Policy Desk, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 June, 2025; by Akifumi Fukuoka, Deputy Director, Conventional Arms Division, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 June 2025; New Zealand Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I; New Zealand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024) Form I; Norway Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024) Form I; Sweden Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024) Form I; Switzerland Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024) Form I; and UK Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024) Form J. See, [Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database](#) and [Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database](#). Average exchange rates for 2024: CHF0.8808=US\$1; €1=US\$1.082; NOK10.7574=US\$1; NZ\$1=US\$0.605; £1=US\$1.2781; SEK10.5744=US\$1; and ¥151.4551=US\$1. United States (US) Federal Reserve, “[List of Exchange Rates \(Annual\)](#),” 6 January 2025. Currency conversions have been rounded to the nearest dollar (US\$). Calculation of total in US dollars was made prior to rounding.

124. See previous Support for Mine Action country profiles. International Campaign to Ban Landmines - Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), “[Country Profiles: Myanmar](#),” undated; and ICBL-CMC, “[Country Profiles: Myanmar \(archives\)](#),” undated.

Cluster Munitions

Summary. Myanmar has expressed interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions but has not taken any steps to join it. Myanmar has participated in several meetings of the convention, and since 2022 has voted in favor of an important annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the convention.

In the past, Myanmar has stated that it has never used, produced, or transferred cluster munitions. However, evidence has emerged indicating that its armed forces have been using a domestically-produced cluster munition since 2022. Myanmar denies the weapon is a cluster munition.

Policy

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.¹²⁵

After Myanmar's armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, took control of the country in a military coup on 1 February 2021, a provisional government was formed that is headed by the State Administration Council. Parliamentarians elected prior to the coup in November 2020 formed a National Unity Government in exile in April 2021, which holds Myanmar's seat at the United Nations (UN).¹²⁶

Myanmar has expressed interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions but has not taken any steps to accede to it. Previously, in November 2019, Myanmar reiterated that it could not join the convention until a nationwide peace agreement had been reached with non-state armed groups (NSAGs).¹²⁷ Myanmar has expressed concern at the "indiscriminate use" of cluster munitions, which it says can lead to "vulnerability and serious humanitarian impact." It regards the Convention on Cluster Munitions as essential for "preventing humanitarian consequences of conventional weapons."¹²⁸

Myanmar participated in a regional meeting of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, held in Vientiane, Lao PDR in October 2008. Myanmar attended another regional conference on the convention held in Bali, Indonesia in November 2009.

Myanmar has participated as an observer at several meetings of the convention, most recently attending the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2024.¹²⁹ Myanmar has attended regional workshops on the convention.¹³⁰

Since 2022, Myanmar has voted in favor of an important annual UNGA resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to "ratify or accede to it as soon as possible."¹³¹ Myanmar previously abstained from voting on the resolution in 2015–2021.

Myanmar endorsed an October 2024 statement at the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that recognized the "adverse humanitarian impact caused by the use of cluster munitions."¹³²

125. The military regime changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in 1989, but many ethnic groups in Myanmar's border areas and several countries still prefer to use the name Burma.

126. The Provisional Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar was formed on 1 August 2021 by the State Administration Council, with the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, as its chair.

127. Myanmar Explanation of Vote on Resolution A/C.1/L.46, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 6 November 2019.

128. [Statement of Myanmar](#), UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 24 October 2024.

129. Myanmar participated as an observer at the convention's Meetings of States Parties in 2010, 2012, and 2024, as well as the Second Review Conference held in November 2020 and September 2021.

130. Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the UN in Geneva press release, "[Philippines hosts webinar to promote Convention on Cluster Munitions among ASEAN Member States](#)," 29 July 2020.

131. "[Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions](#)," UNGA Resolution 79/58, 2 December 2024.

132. [Statement of Myanmar](#), UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 24 October 2024; and [statement of NAM](#), UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 23 October 2024.

Myanmar is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty or the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Myanmar continued to produce cluster munitions in 2025.¹³³ It is unclear if Myanmar has imported or otherwise acquired cluster munitions in the past.

Myanmar possesses domestically-produced stocks of cluster munitions.¹³⁴

In 2023, evidence emerged indicating that Myanmar has manufactured cluster munitions since 2021. The Myanmar Armed Forces has since used them in several attacks within the country.¹³⁵

The cluster munition produced by Myanmar is an air-delivered munition comprised of a shell casing that contains 120mm mortar projectiles as submunitions. Each submunition has a plastic arming vane attached to an impact fuze that detonates on contact. The cluster bomb canister has space for 12 mortar projectile submunitions attached on an internal frame. It appears to meet the definition of a cluster munition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

State-owned Myanmar Defence Products Industries (also known as KaPaSa) manufactured the cluster munition at its DI-21 facility in Seikphyu township in Magway region, while the submunitions were manufactured at its DI-3 facility in Sinda township in Magway region.¹³⁶

In March 2024, the Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the UN in Geneva issued a statement denying that this weapon is a cluster munition, stating, “With regard to the allegations of use of cluster munitions, the munitions used by Myanmar do not fall within the characteristics of cluster munitions defined by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”¹³⁷

Myanmar is not known to have produced or used cluster munitions before 2021, although a rudimentary cluster munition was documented in the country over a decade ago. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), an NSAG operating in northeast Myanmar, alleged in January 2013 that the Tatmadaw had used an old weapon that was similar in design to a modern cluster munition near the town of Laiza, in Kachin state.¹³⁸ The Monitor found that an “adapter” and 20-pound fragmentation bombs, documented in photographs reviewed by Human Rights Watch (HRW), may meet the definition of a cluster munition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.¹³⁹

133. In May 2025, remnants of a cluster bomb used in an airstrike on Kyondoe in Kawkariek township, Karen state, bore production markings dated 20 April 2025. Myanmar Defense and Security Institute (MDSI) [Facebook post](#), 2 May 2025.

134. Myanmar possesses 122mm Type-81, Type-90B, and M1985 240mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known if these include versions with submunition payloads. See, Myanmar Defense Weapons, “[Some modern military weapons of Myanmar Army](#),” 20 March 2014; and Hla Oo’s Blog, “[Burma Army’s MRLS or Multi Rocket Launcher Systems](#),” 23 March 2014.

135. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “[Briefing Paper: Cluster Munition Production and Use in Myanmar/Burma](#),” 31 August 2023.

136. Information shared with the Monitor by a local source who requested anonymity, 12 July 2024.

137. Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the UN in Geneva, “[Myanmar’s Observations on the report entitled ‘Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar’](#),” 15 March 2024.

138. “[Burma army allegedly uses cluster bombs to take KIO position](#),” Burma News International (BNI), 28 January 2013. On 19 April 2013, the deputy secretary of the Kachin National Council (KNC) provided photographs to the CMC showing an unknown type of air-dropped bomb that it said, “confirmed that the World War-Two era 20-pound fragmentation bombs were used during the airstrikes in the KIA’s strategic outposts between 14 December 2012 and 8 January 2013 by the Myanmar Air Force.” According to the KNC, “this type has never been used in Burma’s civil war before.” The photographs were contained in an email sent to the CMC by Hkun Htoi, Deputy Secretary, KNC, 19 April 2013.

139. There is evidence that Myanmar government forces mounted six fragmentation bombs to the adapter, which then separated from the rack when dropped from the air. Photographs show a metal tubular rack that appears to be similar in design to the United States (US)-produced M1 cluster adapter. The small fragmentation bombs are of a more modern design and marking than World War II-era munitions. A military officer who requested anonymity confirmed to the Monitor that the weapon was manufactured in Myanmar, while a former military ordnance officer confirmed that the markings on the weapons were those used by the Myanmar Armed Forces.

Previously, in 2009, Myanmar stated at a regional meeting on the convention that, “we do not use cluster munitions, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, nor assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under this Convention.”¹⁴⁰

Use

Myanmar has denied using cluster munitions. In 2015, at the UNGA, Myanmar stated that “cluster munitions were never used in...operations” by the Tatmadaw.¹⁴¹

Evidence has emerged indicating that the Myanmar Armed Forces have used a domestically-produced cluster munition in attacks in several parts of the country since 2022. Attacks involving cluster munitions continued to be reported in 2025.

Cluster munitions were allegedly used in an airstrike on a school in Paingyak village in Kawkareik township, Karen state, on 9 June 2025.¹⁴²

Cluster munitions were reportedly used in an attack on a school in O-Htein village in Depayin township, Sagaing region, on 12 May 2025. The Myanmar military denied the allegation.¹⁴³

Cluster munitions were allegedly used in several attacks during 2024, including an attack on Auk Chaing village in Mindat township, Chin state on 3 April that the Myanmar military denied undertaking.¹⁴⁴ Photographs of the aftermath of an 8 January 2024 airstrike in Thapyi Kan village in Mrauk-U township, Rakhine state, show cluster munition remnants.¹⁴⁵

Previous use

The Myanmar Air Force has used cluster munitions in airstrikes in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states, and in the Sagaing region, since mid-2022. For example:

- On 1 December 2023, cluster munitions were used in an attack that damaged homes in Namkham township, in northern Shan state. The attack allegedly killed one resident and injured five others, according to an investigation by Amnesty International.¹⁴⁶
- Photographs of the aftermath of a 6 June 2023 airstrike in Kedong village in Kawkareik township, Kayin state, showed cluster munition remnants at a damaged school.¹⁴⁷
- On 25 April 2023, cluster munition remnants were found after an attack by the Myanmar Air Force on a hospital in Saung Pwe village in Pekhon township, Shan state, which injured five people.¹⁴⁸ On the same day, the Myanmar Air Force dropped a cluster bomb near the village of Mae Ka Neh in Myawaddy township, Kayin state, wounding four civilians.¹⁴⁹

140. Statement of Ye Minn Thein, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Conference on the Promotion and Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Bali, 16 November 2009.

141. [Statement of Myanmar](#), UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 15 October 2015.

142. [“Myanmar Junta Accused of Using Cluster Bombs in Deadly Attack on Karen Village School,”](#) The Irrawaddy, 11 June 2025.

143. Grant Peck, [“Funerals Held in Myanmar for Pupils and Teachers killed in airstrike on school,”](#) Associated Press (AP), 13 May 2025; and [“False airstrike reports spread by malicious media,”](#) The Global New Light of Myanmar, 13 May 2025.

144. See, [“Regime accused of using cluster bombs in Arakan State,”](#) Development Media Group (DMG), 12 October 2024; Brian Wei, [“Myanmar Junta Airstrikes Kill 13 Civilians After Defeat in Mandalay Township,”](#) The Irrawaddy, 5 August 2024; and [“Subversive media circulate misinformation about Aukchai village in Mindat,”](#) The Global New Light of Myanmar, 7 April 2024.

145. Narinjara News [Facebook post](#), 8 January 2024.

146. Amnesty International, [“Myanmar: Military should be investigated for war crimes in response to ‘Operation 1207’,”](#) 21 December 2023.

147. Karen National Union (KNU) [Facebook post](#), 7 June 2023; and subsequent correspondence on Signal with a Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) officer, 20 June 2023. The KNLA officer requested anonymity.

148. It is possible that the casualties were caused by other weapons used in the same attack, but may have been the result of cluster munitions. Karenni Human Rights Group (KHRG) [Facebook post](#), 25 April 2023; and email exchange between the KHRG and the Monitor, 2023.

149. Photographic evidence provided to the Monitor by a KNLA officer via Signal, 8–11 May 2023. The KNLA officer requested anonymity.

- In April 2023, a cluster bomb attack in Mindat township, Chin state, resulted in casualties. Cluster bomb remnants had earlier been found in the same township after a July 2022 aerial attack that wounded 13 civilians, according to Amnesty International.¹⁵⁰
- Between 17 February and 7 March 2023, witnesses to Myanmar Air Force attacks near the three villages of Kon Tha, Nam Mae Kon, and Warisuplia, all in Demoso township, Kayah state, reported hearing multiple explosions indicating the use of cluster bombs, and later found cluster bomb remnants.¹⁵¹
- In May 2022, local media published images of cluster bomb remnants from attacks on 14, 15, and 20 May in Kale and Mingin townships, in the Sagaing region.¹⁵²
- In April 2022, a cluster bomb was used in an attack in P’Loo village tract in Myawaddy township, Kayah state.¹⁵³

A report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, published in March 2024, notes that “photograph and video evidence suggests the Myanmar military’s continued use of cluster munitions, including during Operation 1027. The military’s use of cluster munitions, which are inherently indiscriminate weapons, in areas inhabited by civilians likely constitutes a war crime.”¹⁵⁴

The Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the UN in Geneva issued a statement in response to the report, calling it “another tool to discredit the Government.”¹⁵⁵ Myanmar did not deny undertaking the attacks, but denied using cluster munitions, stating: “With regard to the allegations of use of cluster munitions, the munitions used by Myanmar do not fall within the characteristics of cluster munitions defined by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”

Cluster munition remnant contamination

According to Monitor information, the Myanmar Armed Forces have used a domestically produced cluster munition in attacks in several parts of the country since at least 2021, with attacks recorded regularly since that time.¹⁵⁶ The extent of any cluster munition remnant contamination in Myanmar, however, remains unknown.¹⁵⁷

150. Amnesty International, “[Deadly Cargo: Exposing the Supply Chain that Fuels War Crimes in Myanmar](#),” 3 November 2022, pp.28–29. An impact ‘splatter’ pattern documented after an aerial attack in Kayah state was identified by the Monitor as typical of a mortar strike. This was attributed in the report to a submunition from an air-dropped cluster bomb.

151. Email correspondence with David Eubanks, Founder, Free Burma Rangers (FBR), 21–23 May 2023.

152. “[Military Council attacks with devastating, domestically produced bombs in Sagaing](#),” The Irrawaddy, 31 May 2022.

153. KHRG, “[Bombs and Bullets Like Rain: Air strikes in the ‘peace town’ and places of refuge in Dooplaya District, December 2021 to May 2022](#),” 23 December 2022. See, photographs of cluster bomb tail, nose, and framing bent from impact, p. 10. KHRG did not identify the bomb type.

154. UN Human Rights Council, “[Report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar by Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews](#),” A/HRC/55/65, 20 March 2024.

155. Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the UN in Geneva, “[Myanmar’s Observations on the report entitled ‘Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar’](#),” 15 March 2024.

156. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “[Landmine Monitor Myanmar/Burma Country Report December 2024](#),” December 2024, p. 15; Cluster Munition Coalition, “[Cluster Munition Monitor 2025](#),” September 2025, pp. 19–20; The Irrawaddy, “[Myanmar Junta Accused of Using Cluster Bombs in Deadly Attack on Karen Village School](#),” The Irrawaddy Newsletter, 11 June 2025; and Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “[Briefing Paper: Cluster Munition Production and Use in Myanmar/Burma](#),” August 2023.

157. Cluster Munition Coalition, “[Cluster Munition Monitor 2025](#),” September 2025, p. 63.