

FAIRNESS IN MYANMAR'S ELECTIONS: ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES AND EQUALITY OF THE VOTE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Myanmar's 2015 general elections represented the first competitive elections held in the country in over two decades, resulting in a landslide victory for the country's main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). Observers reported a relatively open campaign environment and the ability of voters to cast their ballot freely.


However, many election observer organisations and political analysts noted the substantial difference in Myanmar's constituency sizes which challenges the fairness of the election. The largest electoral constituency in Myanmar had 322 times more eligible voters than the smallest one. In practice, this meant that the vote of one citizen in a small constituency could be 300 times more powerful than the vote of a citizen in a large constituency. Furthermore, candidates in the biggest constituencies must compete for hundreds of thousands of votes to win a seat, while those in other constituencies need only to compete for a few thousand votes.

This level of inequality is due to Myanmar's use of administrative boundaries (townships) as the basis for drawing electoral boundaries. Because the use of administrative boundaries often results in unfairness in elections, many democracies look to other approaches to delimit electoral constituencies. International and domestic observers in Myanmar recommended that the Union Election Commission (UEC) review and amend electoral boundaries to ensure equality of the vote before the next national elections in 2020. This includes establishing clear and reasonable criteria for electoral boundaries – such as population size, geography and minority representation – as well as a limit to variation in the size of constituencies.

A transparent and inclusive process for designing and establishing the criteria for electoral boundaries could contribute to an improved electoral process. As a first step, clear and objective criteria could be established for how boundaries are drawn. Laws and procedures could be established to ensure that decision-making is transparent, open to public input, and conducted in a timely manner. By making the delimitation process accountable to public objections or complaints, electoral authorities could also increase the acceptance of results.

A systematic change to districting in Myanmar would require constitutional change, because the constitution identifies administrative boundaries, namely townships, as the main basis for lower house constituencies. However, a few changes could be made without changing the constitution – for example, setting clear criteria for adjustments in boundaries based on population in the delimitation of both the lower and upper house constituencies. Furthermore, the process and timelines for districting could be laid out in more detail in law. Careful research, deliberation and public consultation should be undertaken to weigh different reform options. Civil society, including those in ethnic minority areas, as well as political parties and candidates, should have an opportunity to provide input into changes that can directly influence public confidence in future elections.

UNEQUAL VOTING POWER IN MYANMAR'S ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCIES



1. KEY CONSIDERATIONS IN ELECTORAL BOUNDARY DELIMITATION

The delimitation of electoral boundaries – the geographic territory represented by an elected seat – is one of the key features of almost every electoral system and has profound consequences for the electoral and political systems of the country. The rules and process for deciding those boundaries can have a direct impact on the fairness of an election and on the power of each citizen's vote, which should be equal.

If constituencies are badly designed¹, i.e. having significantly different population sizes, the votes of citizens in different places will not be equal. Constituencies for Myanmar's Pyithu Hluttaw are vastly different in the number of voters (as shown in Figure 1, above). Under this type of malapportionment, some citizens' votes have more power than others. For example, in a constituency with 1500 voters, one person's vote has a much greater influence in selecting a winning candidate.

1.1. INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND GOOD PRACTICES IN DELIMITATION

As Myanmar stakeholders consider electoral reform, it is useful to look to international obligations, principles and good practices. Many international mechanisms address issues related to boundary delimitation, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), as well as regional mechanisms and norms. Common principles that are echoed among these documents may provide helpful guidance as reforms are discussed and considered.

1.2. EQUALITY OF THE VOTE

A fundamental principle in electoral boundaries is equality of the vote. This principle is enshrined in Article 21(3) of the UDHR. The ICCPR also addresses the principle of equality, as explained further by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC): "The principle of one person, one vote must apply, and within the framework of each State's electoral system, the vote of one elector should be equal to the vote of another. The drawing of electoral boundaries and the method of allocating votes should not distort the distribution of voters or discriminate against any group and should not exclude or restrict unreasonably the right of citizens to choose their representatives freely."²

1.3. NON-DISCRIMINATION

The UDHR is clear that everyone is entitled to fundamental rights, including equality of the vote and the right to run for election, regardless of their race, language, religion or national or social origin, among other characteristics.³ In boundary delimitation, discrimination can occur when constituencies are created that distort the distribution of voters and discriminate against any group of voters.⁴

What are Myanmar's commitments regarding electoral boundaries?

Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Myanmar is bound to ensure that citizens enjoy **equality of the vote** and that citizens are **free from discrimination**, especially when practicing their fundamental rights, like voting.

The establishment of constituencies should not be designed in way that weakens representation of certain groups – especially ethnic minorities – by increasing the size of

¹ Malapportionment is the term used when electoral constituencies are not apportioned to have equal populations. When constituencies are intentionally drawn unequally to give more power (or less power) to a certain group of voters in order to benefit a certain candidate, it is known as "gerrymandering."

² UNHRC General Comment 25 (21) in regards to the ICCPR.

³ Other treaties, including ICERD, also prohibit discriminatory laws and policies.

⁴ UNHRC General Comment 25 (21)

constituencies⁵ or in a way that discriminates against certain political parties. In addition to overarching principles found in international treaties and norms, the lessons learned and practices of other democracies can provide helpful guidance when making decisions and considering reforms in boundary delimitation.

1.4. ADMINISTRATIVE VS. ELECTORAL DELIMITATION

Some countries, including Myanmar, match electoral constituencies with the administrative units of the country. However, administrative borders do not necessarily take into consideration principles such as equality. Instead, administrative boundaries correspond to functions such as taxation, regulation, and service delivery. Some countries reconcile administrative and electoral considerations by utilising administrative boundaries and making adjustments to create relatively equal electoral districts. For example, to achieve equality in votes, adjustments can be made by either splitting an administrative district into multiple electoral districts, combining administrative districts into one electoral district or by allocating a certain number of seats based on the population in the administrative district.

1.5. DEROGATIONS AND VARIATIONS IN CONSTITUENCY SIZE

International treaty bodies recognise that “derogations” – or practical deviations from principles or rules – are sometimes necessary. However, derogations should be permitted exclusively on objective and reasonable criteria.⁶ One common area of derogation is in the principle of equality of the vote. It is impossible to create exactly equal constituencies due to frequent population shifts and geographic considerations (for example, in mountainous areas it may be unreasonable to merge valleys into one district, if there are no roads to connect them). In some countries, the legal framework specifies an allowable and reasonable rate of deviation in constituency size, and clear criteria when deviation may occur.⁷ For example, in order to protect minorities, the principle of equality of the vote is derogated in some cases to allow for the election of minority representatives. Common international practice suggests that the variations in the size

of constituencies should not exceed 10-15%, or up to 20% in exceptional circumstances.⁸

1.6. DECISION MAKING IN ELECTORAL DELIMITATION

As described above, electoral delimitation has the potential to seriously impact the fairness of an election. As such, delimitation – whether for the first time or during periodic adjustment – requires a well-informed, transparent, inclusive and accountable decision making process. Good practice and general standards of electoral decision making provide guidance on how the delimitation process should proceed. Key considerations include:

Global Examples: Who draws boundaries?

Democracies take different approaches to appoint a delimitation body. Some approaches are considered more neutral and independent than others:

- Create a **non-partisan, independent delimitation body** that may coordinate with other ministries. (Australia and Canada)
- Assign **multi-party commissions**, which includes representatives from major parties (New Zealand)
- Assign the **electoral management body** (Mexico)
- Assign **elected members of the legislature** to draw boundaries (Belgium and Bulgaria)

APPOINTING AN INDEPENDENT BODY TO DRAW ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES: Because electoral boundaries are so crucial to electoral integrity, it is important that they are drawn by a neutral, independent and trusted body. This body should have a mandate to draw boundaries according to clear and pre-set criteria and in accordance with a reasonable timeline, as described below.

ESTABLISHING DELIMITATION CRITERIA: Constituencies should be determined using one or more clearly defined criteria. Equal population is a common criteria, often determined by the resident population or number of citizens, or the number of registered voters. Consideration may also be given to geographic criteria.⁹ Whatever criteria is established, the delimitation body should ensure it utilises the most accurate and up-to-date information and data-sets available to draw boundaries.

⁵ European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), *Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters*, 23 May 2003; NDI: Promoting Legal Frameworks for Democratic Elections; OSCE (ODIHR): Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Participating States; OSCE (ODIHR): Guidelines to Assist National Minority Participation in the Electoral Process; UN (Center for Human Rights): Human Rights and Elections.

⁶ UNHRC General Comment 25 (4)

⁷ For example, electoral laws in Germany, New Zealand and Canada specify the maximum deviation allowed.

⁸ In the *Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters* (2003), the Venice Commission suggests a deviation of 10%, or 15% in exceptional circumstances (p. 7, 17). In reviewing practice of the Republic of Georgia, the Venice Commission acknowledged that in very inaccessible and remote regions, a deviation of up to 20% would be reasonable. For more information, see *Opinion on the Unified Election Code of Georgia*, 24 May 2002, para. 22

⁹ Venice Commission, *Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters*, p. 6, p. 17

REASONABLE TIMELINE AND CYCLE FOR DELIMITATION: Delimitation should be conducted at regular intervals to ensure up-to-date and equal constituencies. It should be conducted well in advance of elections, but no later than one year before elections.¹⁰

Global Examples: When are boundaries drawn?

Countries make different rules for re-drawing boundaries, some based on a cycle while others are based on events/triggers.

Periodic Review: Many countries require that boundaries be re-drawn every 10 years (India, United States) or 5 years (Albania, New Zealand)

Event/Trigger: Some countries require that boundaries are reviewed after a certain event (like a census), or a certain trigger, like a change in seat numbers or reaching a certain level of mal-apportionment. For example, in Germany, boundaries must be re-drawn once population changes cause constituencies to deviate beyond 25%. (For more information, see: <http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/bdb/bdb02>)

PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY: The UDHR (Art. 8) requires access to justice for those whose rights have been violated. In the context of delimitation, citizens should have the opportunity to challenge or appeal in cases where delimitation violates key rights, such as equality of vote.

TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: The delimitation of constituencies should be conducted in an inclusive and transparent manner. Measures for transparency and public input are often included in the law or regulations related to boundary delimitation. Such laws and regulations should be drafted with the input of electoral stakeholders and should clearly define the roles of relevant authorities.¹¹

Global Examples: How do delimitation bodies ensure transparency and manage public input?

South Africa's delimitation body uses a website to provide information about electoral boundaries, announce the timing of public hearings and accept public objections to proposed boundaries.

In **Canada**, the law specifies that the delimitation bodies must increase public awareness and involvement. The bodies must publish proposed boundaries in the newspaper and must hold public hearings to receive feedback. The public may submit written or oral suggestions or objections to draft or final proposals. Typically, bodies receive numerous comments from parties, Members of Parliament, CSOs and members of the public. (For more information, see IFES: Challenging the Norms and Standards of Election Administration, 2007)

2. BOUNDARY DELIMITATION IN MYANMAR

2.1. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Myanmar employs a First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system, where voters elect a single representative from a constituency for national and state/regional parliaments.¹² Myanmar's legal framework directs the delimitation of constituencies (summarized in Table 1). The Constitution lays out a number of general principles, which establish that citizens have equal rights and shall not face discrimination due to race, birth, religion, official position, status, culture, sex, or wealth (Art. 347). The Constitution also states that every eligible citizen shall have the right to elect and be elected (Art. 38a).

The Constitution establishes two houses of national parliament: the Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) – elected on the basis of townships “as well as population”; and the Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house) – elected from an equal number of representative from each state and region. The Constitution also delineates the structure of administrative boundaries and empowers the President, at the recommendation of the

¹⁰ OSCE (ODIHR): Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Participating States; Venice Commission, *Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters*, p. 10, p. 26

¹¹ OSCE Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Participating States; IDEA International Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal Framework of Elections; Venice Commission, *Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters*, p. 7

¹² Boundaries for Myanmar's 14 state and region Hluttaws are created by assigning two seats per township, regardless of population. This paper focuses on boundaries for national parliament, though the guiding principles, areas for improvement, and recommendations discussed herein are also applicable to the process for delimiting boundaries at the state/region level.

Chief Minister of a State/Region, to alter or form the territorial boundaries of townships.¹³

2.2. WHAT IS THE METHOD OF DESIGNATING CONSTITUENCIES?

According to the respective Pyithu and Amyotha Hluttaw Election Laws, the UEC is designated to establish electoral constituencies for the length of a Hluttaw term. The UEC must designate the constituencies for the next election at least 60 days in advance of the expiration of the term of the Hluttaw. UEC by-laws and working guidelines require that sub-commissions at the ward, village tract and township levels submit a list of areas within the constituency, but there are not clear criteria and procedures for how the UEC determines those constituencies. There are also no requirements for transparency or public consultation during the UEC’s delimitation process.

DESIGNATING ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCIES	
PYITHU HLUTTAW	AMYOTHA HLUTTAW
<p>According to Art. 109 of Myanmar’s Constitution, the Pyithu Hluttaw is comprised of a maximum of 440 representatives. Up to 110 representatives are selected from Defense Service personnel by the Commander-in-Chief. Additionally, not more than 330 representatives are elected “on the basis of township as well as population or combining with an appropriate township which is contiguous to the newly-formed township if it is more than 330 townships” in accordance with the law.</p> <p>According to the Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, the UEC shall assign constituencies. By default, the law instructs the UEC to designate one constituency in a township as long as the number of townships is equal to maximum number of seats (330) in the Pyithu Hluttaw. Should the number of townships not equal 330, the UEC is allowed to make adjustments utilizing township boundaries by either splitting high population townships into more than one constituency or by combining multiple, lower population townships into one constituency.</p>	<p>According to Art. 141 of Myanmar’s Constitution, the Amyotha Hluttaw consists of 168 representatives, with 12 elected from each state and region; and 56 representatives appointed among the Defense Services, with 4 appointed from each state and region. As states and regions vary widely in size of population and number of townships, and since no state/region has exactly 12 townships, the UEC makes adjustments utilizing township and district boundaries to make electoral constituencies.</p> <p>According to the Amyotha Hluttaw Election Law, the UEC should follow steps that consider population size and geographic cohesion to create 12 electoral boundaries within each states/region. Large population townships can be split into two constituencies, or contiguous, small population townships can be combined into one constituency, to create 12 boundaries within a state/region. As shown in Figure 2 below, these allowed adjustments result in the Amyotha constituencies being relatively more equal in size than Pyithu constituencies.</p>

Table 1



¹³ Before the 2008 Constitution was in place, new townships were created by the General Division of the General Administration Department. There are currently 330 townships in Myanmar. See The Asia Foundation: Administering the State in Myanmar: An Overview of the General Administration Department. 2014. Page 20.

3. KEY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Many observers of Myanmar's 2015 elections pointed to electoral boundary delimitation as an important area for reform. As previously discussed, electoral boundaries can directly impact the fairness of an election and the process for determining electoral boundaries can either build or degrade public confidence in elections. Key issues and recommendations are detailed below.

3.1. INEQUALITY OF THE VOTE

In Myanmar's 2015 elections, there was a large inequality of the vote because constituencies varied significantly in size. Within the Pyithu Hluttaw, the average constituency had approximately 100,000 eligible voters. However, the numbers varied from as many as 454,307 eligible voters in the largest constituency (Hlaing Tharyar Township) to as few as 1,408 eligible voters in the smallest constituency (Inja Yan Township). As a result, voters in Inja Yan Township had a more direct influence on electing a member of Parliament, compared to voters in Hlaing Tharyar, whose votes are more diluted. In plain terms, this means that a voter in Inja Yan has significantly more influence on his/her national government than a voter in Hlaing Tharyar.

As previously noted, many countries limit deviation between the size of constituencies. Common international standards recommend no more than 10-15% variation in constituency size. Some countries, like New Zealand, allow only 5%, while others, such as Canada, allow for up to 25% variation (or more in justifiable "extreme circumstances").¹⁴ In Myanmar, the variation is extreme. In the lower house, the largest constituency deviates from the average by 328%, and in the upper house by 233% - well outside of international norms. Figure 2 shows that Myanmar's range of deviation is significantly larger than common international practice.

Unequal constituencies also led to concerns about manipulation in advance of the 2015 polls. Electoral analysts and members of the media speculated that very small constituencies could be targeted for fraud, intimidation, and/or vote buying, since the share of votes needed to win was so small and since many of these constituencies were remote and difficult to observe.

Deviation in the size of electoral constituencies




Figure 2. Variations in the constituency sizes for the Pyithu Hluttaw

3.2. DECISION MAKING FOR ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES

The establishment of electoral boundaries in Myanmar has been relatively predictable since the practice so closely follows administrative units. However, the decision making process for this important aspect of the electoral process does not meet many important standards of practice discussed above.

3.3. DELIMITATION BODY

The UEC maintains sole discretion to draw boundaries for Myanmar's electoral districts (in addition to all other electoral processes). However, in advance of 2015, many opposition parties and members of the public questioned the neutrality of the UEC, which is appointed by the president and which – by law – may include officials who only recently resigned from political parties. Should decisions about boundaries ever be called into question, it is unclear if the UEC would be seen as a neutral arbiter to make fair and nonpartisan determinations.

3.4. CRITERIA FOR DECISION MAKING

Under the current system, there is little discretion for delimiting boundaries in the Pyithu Hluttaw, but the UEC must make a number of decisions in combining and splitting townships into constituencies for the Amyotha Hluttaw. There was little public information about the criteria used or the process followed to make those decisions ahead of the 2015 elections.

3.5. TIMELINE FOR DELIMITATION

In 2015, the UEC announced constituencies for Pyithu, Amyotha and State/Region Hluttaws in early July – while candidates were required to register by early August and the

¹⁴ For more information and for examples of allowed deviation around the world, see Ace Project "Equal Population in Redistricting." <http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/bdb/bdb05/bdb05a>.

polls were set to be held in November that year. The UEC's announcement was earlier than the legal requirement of 60 days before the incumbent Hluttaw's term expires. However, Myanmar's delimitation is extremely late compared to international practice, in which boundaries are often declared at least a year before election day.¹⁵ Should the boundaries ever shift significantly, political parties and candidates might not have sufficient time to nominate candidates and prepare campaign strategies.

3.6. CRITERIA PUBLIC INFORMATION, INPUT AND OBJECTIONS

Aside from announcing final constituencies, very little information regarding boundary delimitation was released or discussed with electoral stakeholders ahead of the 2015 polls. Proposals to determine boundaries were not discussed publicly and there was no opportunity for public input. There was also no opportunity – legally or in practice – for political parties, civil society groups or citizens to question or challenge the fairness of boundaries once they were announced.




Figure 3

¹⁵ Similar complaints have been raised about the late legal deadline to announce the timing of other key election processes, such as the election date, the start of the campaign period, voter registration, etc.

4. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE BOUNDARY DELIMITATION IN MYANMAR?

Myanmar's government and other electoral stakeholders could consider a number of measures to improve electoral boundary delimitation and create a more transparent, inclusive and accountable delimitation process, enhancing the equality and fairness of elections.

Illustrative options for legal and administrative reforms are set out below. These options are non-exhaustive, and alternative measures should be studied and deliberated by stakeholders. All reform options should be discussed in a transparent manner and allow for input by electoral stakeholders and the public. Final decision-making should be inclusive of diverse viewpoints, including those of political parties, civil society organisations, and ethnic minorities.

4.1. EQUALITY AND FAIRNESS

Observers of Myanmar's 2015 elections noted inequality of the vote as a significant issue to be addressed in advance of future polls. International observers, such as the European Union, the Carter Center, the Asian Network for Free and Fair Elections (ANFREL), and Myanmar observers, like the People's Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE) and the Ethnic Youth Network Group (EYNG), recommended that electoral boundaries be reviewed and amended to create constituencies that ensure equality of the vote. The EU highlighted the Pyithu Hluttaw constituencies as a priority for reform, while noting that the Amyotha Hluttaw is intentionally designed to equalise representation between Myanmar's regions and ethnic states.¹⁶

The underlying cause of inequality in Myanmar's electoral system is its reliance on administrative units as electoral boundaries. Admittedly, moving away from this system would raise new, complex challenges for Myanmar's government and electoral stakeholders. The discussion of equality of the vote is also related to a discussion of minorities' representation in decision-making and to the system of representation in general. A discussion of electoral districts is therefore key to improve equality and representation.

Reforms could greatly improve the fairness of elections and equality of the vote, bringing the country closer in line with its constitutional and international obligations of equal suffrage and non-discrimination. Reforms could occur through various types of action.

For example:

- **Constitutional Change:** Art. 12 and 109 of the Constitution could be revised to form Pyithu Hluttaw constituencies on the basis of population, with consideration to geographic cohesion and territory (rather than townships).
- **Election Law Amendment:** Art. 4 of the Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law could be revised to create 330 equally sized constituencies on the basis of population by splitting townships and combining neighbouring townships. This type of change would adhere to the current constitution, utilising both townships and population size as criteria for constituencies, and is similar to what already exists for Amyotha Hluttaw constituencies.

4.2. DELIMITATION PROCESS

Similarly, measures could be taken to improve the decision making process for boundary delimitation, including but not limited to:

Parliament could establish an independent and competent delimitation body mandated to draw electoral boundaries or to propose a revision to electoral boundaries to Parliament and Government.

For example:

- **Election Law Amendment:** Election laws could be revised to appoint or establish an independent commission, composed for example of electoral experts, parties and the UEC, mandated to draw electoral boundaries.

Establish clear criteria for the range of deviation in constituency size. For example:

- **Election Law Amendment:** As recommended by ANFREL, election laws could be revised to specify a permissible range of deviation in the size of constituencies. As is practised in other countries, a standard deviation could be established along with a range of allowable deviation for clearly defined "extreme circumstances" (for example, extreme geographic challenges).

Include specific procedures for the body mandated with delimitation to follow when deciding electoral boundaries.

For example:

- **Election Law Amendment:** Election laws could be revised to delineate how electoral boundaries are established, including the criteria to be used and applied to draw constituencies of equal size. In addition, the law could include other considerations in determining boundaries, such as the interests of communities, or geography.¹⁷

¹⁶ In many countries, the upper house is designed to equally represent geographic regions or minority groups regardless of population, while the lower house is designed to ensure equal representation according to population. For more information, see IFES: Challenging the Norms and Standards of Election Administration, 2007, page 65.

¹⁷ Venice Commission, *Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters*, p. 17

Establish a more meaningful and reasonable timeline to review, determine, and announce electoral boundaries. For example:

- **Election Law Amendment:** Election laws could be revised to set a reasonable timeline for boundary delimitation. In line with common international practice, this could require the announcement of final boundaries one year before an election or before the expiry of the legislature's term.
- **Administrative Change:** In the absence of legal changes, the UEC could adopt a more appropriate timeline in relation to the election date within its own regulations.

Provide remedies for voters and political competitors whose rights are violated in the boundary delimitation process. For example:

- **Election Law Amendment:** Election laws could be revised to provide for complaints by and remedies for citizens (voters or candidates) whose rights are violated in any aspect of the election process. More narrowly, the laws could be revised to allow a process for citizens (voters or candidates) to challenge electoral boundaries if they violate equality of the vote or fairness of the election.
- **Administrative Change:** In the absence of legal changes, the UEC could establish a process to hear complaints and challenges to announced boundaries from parties or voters, and to make necessary changes before boundaries are finalised.

Require more transparency and public consultation in the boundary delimitation process. For example:

- **Election Law Amendment:** The law could require the delimitation body to publicise and allow time to receive input on proposed boundaries before they are made final.
- **Administrative Change:** The UEC or assigned delimitation body could institute its own practices to publicise its work, establish public hearings and accept challenges to proposed boundaries. Such efforts could include increased outreach to remote communities, utilising web-based information sharing or lower levels of the election commission.

ABOUT DEMOCRACY REPORTING INTERNATIONAL

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<http://www.democracy-reporting.org/myanmar>
myanmar@democracy-reporting.org



STEP
DEMOCRACY
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