
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**PART 1**

**Protection Context Analysis**

**Kachin and Northern Shan October 2015**



The on-going internal conflict between various ethnic armed groups and the Myanmar Army in Kachin and Northern Shan is one of low-level intensity but it has seen the most serious armed confrontations affecting the country in the past years. Concerns arising from this conflict include continuous displacements of civilians, international humanitarian and human rights law violations, sexual and gender based violence and grave violations against children. Meanwhile, the context of the conflict is characterised by a climate of impunity, lack of access to livelihoods for affected populations rendering them dependent upon humanitarian assistance and serious human trafficking and drug-addiction issues compounded by a breakdown in community structures, social protection mechanisms and a slow urbanization of the internally displaced population, which finds itself in an increasingly protracted situation.

**Summary conclusions**

**Main Identified Threats**



The five highest threats that internally displaced persons (IDPs) face in Kachin and Northern Shan, as identified in the protection analysis

**Forced recruitment and use**



**SGBV**





**Lack of documentation**



**Drug use and abuse**



**Lack of humanitarian accessibility**



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# Context summary

The people of Kachin and Northern Shan have sought autonomy from the central government ever since the non-fulfilling of the 1947 Panglong Agreement and independence from the United Kingdom in 1948. Since 2011, four years of clashes between the Government and armed groups have caused the displacement of more than 90,000 people. The majority of IDPs reside in camps and settlements across Government and non-Government controlled areas, others live with host families dispersed in rural areas.

The on-going internal conflict between various ethnic armed groups and the Myanmar Army in Kachin and Northern Shan is one of low-level intensity but it has seen the most serious armed confrontations affecting the country in the past years. Concerns arising from this conflict include continuous displacements of civilians, international humanitarian and human rights law violations, sexual and gender based violence and grave violations against children. Meanwhile, the context of the conflict is characterised by a climate of impunity, lack of access to livelihoods for affected populations rendering them dependent upon humanitarian assistance and serious human trafficking and drug-addiction issues compounded by a breakdown in community structures, social protection mechanisms and a slow urbanization of the IDP population, which finds itself in an increasingly protracted situation.

In view of continuing fighting in 2015, the possibility of return to areas of origin in safety and with dignity remains uncertain for the majority of IDPs. In the meantime, the capacity of international organizations to carry out qualitative protection interventions is impacted by restriction in humanitarian access and low levels of funding. In Northern Shan and remote locations in Kachin, the humanitarian response is also affected by a limited number and capacity of UN and non-governmental partners in hard to reach areas.

# 

# Context analysis

Kachin State has a population of about 1.7 million people mainly Kachin (who are predominantly Christian; Baptist and Catholic), Bamar, Shan and smaller ethnic groups, and is administratively divided into 18 Townships subdivided into wards, village-tracts and villages. Shan State is home to various ethnic minorities that are predominantly Buddhist, such as the Shan, Pa-O, Wa, Lisu and Ta’ang (the latter also called Palaung). Shan is organized into 55 Townships and its population is about 4.7 million. In both states, populations are mainly engaged in agriculture (paddy, sugar cane and groundnut), and to a lesser extent in mining and timber production.

## Tensions rooted in colonial divisions and post-independence promises of autonomy

Historically the Kachin and the Shan were not under the rule of Bamar kings and during British colonial rule Kachin, Chin and Shan states were administered separately. During independence negotiations ethnic nationalities, such as the Kachin and Shan, were included in the political process, which resulted in the 1947 Panglong Agreement.

The Panglong Agreement took place in 1947 between the Burmese government led by Aung San, and the Shan, Kachin and Chin people. The agreement granted these three ‘Frontier Areas’ full autonomy for internal administration, including the right to self-determination, equality and financial management. In addition, the Agreement emphasized that “citizens of the Frontier Areas shall enjoy rights and privileges which are regarded as fundamental in democratic countries”.[[1]](#footnote-1) However, in 1947 Aung San was assassinated and the promises of Panglong were never fulfilled. Following independence from British colonial rule in 1948, ethnic conflicts started and have afflicted the country ever since.

The people of Kachin and Northern Shan have sought autonomy from the central government ever since the failure in fulfilling the 1947 Panglong Agreement. Government decisions which were felt to undermine the Kachin promise of internal autonomy led to the founding of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and subsequently its armed wing the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).

The Shan State Army (SSA) was formed in 1964 by Shan resistance forces.[[2]](#footnote-2) The SSA later split into two factions, creating the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), which signed a ceasefire with the government in 1989, and the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), which continued to fight against the government until an initial ceasefire in January 2012.

The Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army (MNDAA) is the armed wing of the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party (MNTJP). Founded in 1989 and operating in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone, the MNDAA has an estimated strength of 2,000 people. Their political demands are “restoring self-administration in the Kokang region” and ensuring that the Kokang people have ethnic rights and full citizen rights.[[3]](#footnote-3)

The United Wa State Army (UWSA), formed after the fall of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989, is one of the country’s most powerful ethnic armies. It reportedly receives military resources, infrastructure and support from neighbouring China and is active in the Wa Special Administrative Region.

Founded in 1992, with an estimated strength of 1,500 people, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) operates in Northern Shan State. The TNLA is the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF). Currently, TNLA fight alongside the KIA and Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) against the government in Northern Shan State. After the 2010 elections, the government recognized Palaung area (also known as Ta’ang) in Northern Shan State as a Self-Administered Zone. However, it remains underdeveloped and there are very few schools and hospitals.[[4]](#footnote-4)

General Ne Win seized power in the 1962 military coup where the focus was on a unitary homogenous state, refuting a federal union and a democratic government. In Kachin and Northern Shan states, tensions/insurgencies continued until a ceasefire agreement between the government and KIO was signed in 1994. The 17 year long ceasefire ended in June 2011 when the KIA refused to transform into the government Border Guard Force (BGF) (*See below*)*.* Besides the above-mentioned ethnic armed groups, others are also active in Kachin and/or Northern Shan State. *See Annex 1*.

## Geopolitics

Kachin and Shan States have common borders with China, India, Thailand and Laos where more than 35% of the world’s population lives. Both economically and in terms of border stability, Kachin and Shan States are key areas for China. Rich in abundant natural resources (teak forests, jade, [[5]](#footnote-5) gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, amber, etc.), the two states are strategic regions for China’s economy. In addition to logging and mining possibilities, Kachin presents hydroelectric potential in geographical proximity to the Yunan Province; both states offer easy access to the Myanmar market for Chinese products; and, Northern Shan is key to the passing of oil and gas pipelines from the coastline in Rakhine (Andaman Sea and Indian Ocean) to China’s landlocked provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan. China’s proximity to Kachin and Shan States also means that the situation in these areas has a direct impact on China’s border stability.

Meanwhile, Western nations have reestablished strong political and economic presence in long-time embargoed Myanmar since 2011 and represent new competition for China, not only on the economic front but also from a geostrategic point of view, Myanmar being “at the crossroads of Asia where China meets India.”[[6]](#footnote-6)

Eastern Myanmar is a region long associated with narcotics.[[7]](#footnote-7) Large-scale illicit drugs trade and production of heroin and amphetamine have long plagued Northern Shan State and Kachin. All actors in the conflict (ethnic armed groups, local authorities, Myanmar Army) are said to profit from the trade, which is destined largely for China and Thailand. Myanmar is Southeast Asia's largest opium poppy-growing country and the world's second largest after Afghanistan. Its location is strategic from the standpoint of drug-trafficking geopolitics. Routes, borders and other spatial discontinuities are the backbones of the large drug producing and trafficking activities that define the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Myanmar, Laos), but also, to some extent, of the armed conflicts and the counter-narcotics that make the illegal drug industry a feasible and profitable business*.*[[8]](#footnote-8)

## National legal framework

The 2008 Constitution, drafted under military rule, has ensured not only that the military maintains a stake in governance, but also that most governmental power remains highly centralised, providing little space for alternative power structures in contested areas. Under the constitution, 25% seats of parliamentary seats are reserved for the military, along with 3 key cabinet posts in the Ministry of Defense (MOD); Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and Ministry of Border Affairs (MOBA).

Legal and political reforms need to demonstrate to the people of Myanmar that the law has the potential to safeguard their fundamental rights and freedoms and should not be used as a tool of repression. The on-going drafting of Myanmar Child Law which includes a chapter on Children and Armed Conflict, and the review of a new Emergency Care and Treatments of Patients Law, enacted in December 2014, which may allow survivors of SGBV to seek medical care directly without first having to contact local authorities are seen as very positive steps. However, changing the perceptions towards the legal system will require meaningful investment to develop a criminal defence and legal aid system to ensure access to justice. Basic laws require reform such as criminal and criminal procedure law, in addition to the harsh national security laws used historically to repress political opponents of the military government. Furthermore, concerns remain about the independence of the judiciary, the Bar Association and the Human Rights Commission.[[9]](#footnote-9)

During spates of conflict, the Government still imposes military law (this was most recently the case in Kokang where the President’s Office declared the state of emergency and issued a military administrative order in February 2015),[[10]](#footnote-10) which places severe restrictions on freedom of movement and association.

## International law ratifications

Myanmar has ratified three of the core international human rights treaties, namely Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Convention on the Rights of the Child[[11]](#footnote-11) and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. For ratification of other relevant international law treaties *see Myanmar International Law Table in Annex 2.*

## Local governance

Since 2011, Myanmar has engaged in reforms to liberalize and democratize the mechanisms for people’s participation at the local level and increasing the public space available for determining development priorities. Kachin State has seen increased budget allocations in the areas of health, education and access to safe water. According to UNDP,[[12]](#footnote-12) despite the context of conflict in Kachin, more than half the people perceive a sense of security in their area although this varies across townships. Given the history of the state, strengthening local governance capacity to provide services and reduce poverty and improve social cohesion for minorities and vulnerable groups can further consolidate the sense of security felt by the people. Strengthening institutional capacity of local administration in planning, delivering effective public services, and conflict prevention are also critical areas to be addressed.

The KIO maintains an extra-legal bureaucracy in Kachin State and has exclusive control over pockets of territory along the Chinese border. Within its territory, the KIO maintains a police department, fire brigade, education system, immigration department, legal system, Internal displacement, Relief, Resettlement Committee (IRRC) and other institutions of self-government. While the official KIA policy goal is for autonomy within a federal union of Myanmar, rather than outright independence,[[13]](#footnote-13) this is dependent on outcomes of a political dialogue following a National Ceasefire Agreement, which is expected to be agreed in the coming months (*See below*).

In Kachin and Northern Shan the government administrative structure is in place with township authorities present. In some areas teachers have accepted IDP children into government schools. Although Township Medical Officers are present the main health and assistance support to IDPs comes from faith based organizations that administer the IDP camps.

# Conflict analysis

Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts have been fought primarily over claims to governance roles. The core drivers of conflict are therefore related to legitimacy, control over territory and power over populations, with control over natural resources playing an auxiliary, albeit important, role. The Kachin people have been living with armed conflict for 34 out of the last 50 years.

## Reignited conflict in 2011

In June 2011, hostilities resumed between the Myanmar Army (MA) and ethnic insurgencies including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) ending the 17-year long ceasefire. Under the 2008 Constitution ethnic armed groups were to become part of the Myanmar Army as Border Guard Forces (BGF) or pro-government People’s Militia Forces (PMF). When the KIA/O refused to transform into a Border Guard Force, the government declared the 1994 ceasefire over, and refused to register the Kachin State Progressive Party and the Northern Shan State Progressive Party for the November 2010 elections because of their links with the group.[[14]](#footnote-14) Renewed fighting is also linked to KIA/O’s opposition to foreign investment and its control over natural resource exploitation (timber, jade and gold) in Kachin and Northern Shan, including the Myitsone and Ta Ping hydropower dams.[[15]](#footnote-15)

The most immediate trigger of the fighting was the dispute over the control of the area where the Chinese-Myanmar Ta Ping Dam was being built in early 2011. Fighting broke out in the area in June when KIO/KIA opposed the project because it was causing local Kachin villagers to lose their lands and livelihoods. However, decades of built-up tensions, the unsettled status of the KIO, and the unresolved ethnic grievances have all contributed to the re-igniting of armed conflict. Clashes have been ongoing since then, displacing more than 90,000 civilians in and outside Kachin and Northern Shan States.

In early 2015, skirmishes were frequent both in Kachin, Northern Shan and Kokang Special Administrative Region. Current displacement in the Kokang region is a consequence of February 2015 clashes between the MA and allied Ethnic Armed Groups (EAGs): MNDAA, TNLA and the Arakan Army (AA).[[16]](#footnote-16) The majority of the EAGs continue to seek autonomy from central government and hold aspirations for a federal and democratic Myanmar in which the right to self-determination and power sharing among all ethnic groups is enshrined by the country’s constitution.[[17]](#footnote-17)

## Ceasefire and peace process

On 31 March 2015, the possibility of ending more than 60 years of armed conflict in the country emerged when Government negotiators and the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination team (NCCT) representing 16 armed groups, agreed on a draft nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA). The NCA is seen as the beginning of the peace process in Myanmar. However not all armed groups are included, the agreement remains to be officially signed, and, is only the starting point where a political dialogue and political negotiations will be necessary to tackle grievances.

A ceasefire could open possibilities for IDP returns to their areas of origin in Kachin and Shan states (subject to demilitarization of rural areas, mine action and agreed ceasefire monitoring), recovery in conflict-affected areas and inception of programs to foster stability. However, continued clashes may overshadow negotiations and fuel the long-held mistrust between the negotiating parties prolonging displacement and increasing vulnerability of affected populations. The fact that some groups remain outside or not recognized as part of the NCCT could signal that conflicts with those armed groups could continue post NCA. For example, the Arakan Army (AA) and the ethnic Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) are members of the NCCT but are not formally recognized as such by the government.[[18]](#footnote-18) Furthermore, although the Palaung State Liberation Front i.e. the political wing of the TNLA, is a recognized member of the NCCT, it is engaged in on-going conflicts with the MA. Mr. Nai Hong Sar, head of the NCCT, has said that the NCCT was continuing to push for the inclusion of ethnic armed groups that the government did not recognize as parties to the peace process.[[19]](#footnote-19)

|  |
| --- |
| **NCCT member Organizations:**[[20]](#footnote-20)  1. Arakan Liberation Party  2. Arakan National Council  3. Arakan Army  4. Chin National Front  5. Democratic Karen Benevolent Army  6. Karenni National Progressive Party  7. Chairman, Karen National Union  8. KNU/KNLA Peace Council  9. Lahu Democratic Union  10. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army  11. New Mon State Party  12. Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization  13. Palaung State Liberation Front  14. Shan State Progress Party  15. Wa National Organisation  16. Kachin Independence Organization |

For sustainable peace outcomes in Kachin and Shan states as well as in other regions of Myanmar, it is critical that the peace process, both ceasefire negotiations and political dialogues are inclusive of women. Women’s representation in the process is important to ensure that not only the concerns of women, including those around land and security for example, are well represented in the agreements but also that violations committed during conflict, particularly conflict related sexual violence are addressed as part of a process of rehabilitation and reconciliation by ensuring that perpetrators are brought to justice. This will not only form part of a longer journey of reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction but will also serve to rekindle trust in a legal system which has long been subject to military rule. This has been strongly advocated across a number of women’s networks of civil society in Myanmar including the Women’s League of Burma.[[21]](#footnote-21)

## Power dynamics

### Main stakeholders amongst ethnic armed groups

|  |
| --- |
| **Kachin**  Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)/Kachin Independence Army (KIA) |
| **Northern Shan**  Kokang - Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)  Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) also known as Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF)  United Wa State Army(WA)  Restoration Council of Shan State (SSA/RCSS)  Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA)  Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)/Kachin Independence Army (KIA) |

### The role of the military

Myanmar’s army, the Tatmadaw,[[22]](#footnote-22) has been the dominant institution in Myanmar’s post 1948 independence from colonial rule.[[23]](#footnote-23) Following the shift to semi-civilian government in 2011 and the on-going top-down transition to democratic rule, it is assumed that the military will accept being under democratic constraints and hence under civilian control.[[24]](#footnote-24) However, questions remain concerning the Myanmar Army’s intentions and the extent of their involvement in politics and the economy. The MA’s conduct in Kachin and Northern Shan States has raised concern over their role in the peace process, and clashes in these areas have led to question the MA’s genuine commitment.[[25]](#footnote-25) Hostilities since 2011 with the KIO/KIA, and other armed groups in Shan (SSA-S and SSA-N) continue despite the president’s call in December 2011 for an ending to offensive action. Particularly for Kachin, a history of ceasefires lacking in political dialogue to resolve underlying tensions have entrenched a high level of mistrust towards Government and military[[26]](#footnote-26), even though the 31 March 2015 draft nationwide ceasefire agreement has given rise to hope for a resolve of ethnic conflicts in the country.

### Counter insurgency strategies by the Myanmar Army

EAGs have often gained support not just for their political aims, but also as a result of the patron-client community structures and ties between communities and the elites of their particular ethnic group.[[27]](#footnote-27) The MA counter-insurgency tactics made little distinction between soldiers and civilians and instead aimed to devastate entire communities in EAG territories thereby cutting the enemy’s main source of support. The MA also pursues a policy of ‘self-reliance’, especially in front-line areas, which leads state military forces to demand provisions and labour from vulnerable civilian populations.[[28]](#footnote-28) This they have done by confiscating food and agricultural land and by demanding civilian labour.

### Other conflict actors

A full stakeholder analysis is still required to understand the role and relationships between different actors in Northern Shan and Kachin. Analysis of the different operating militia groups, religious leaders, affected populations themselves, business leaders (including Chinese and other foreigners), civil society organizations, political parties, media, drug and trafficking cartels in Myanmar and abroad, etc. and their role in the conflict and supporting the protection environment is an information gap.

## Internal displacement as a result of the conflict

The immediate consequence of the 2011 break of the ceasefire was massive displacement of populations from villages affected by the armed conflicts. The first displacement of IDPs started in Gauri Krung area where the whole village of Sang Gang was forced to flee their village as the MA launched an attack on the pretext of providing security to the joint China-Myanmar project of Ta Ping hydropower dam in Moe Mauk Township in Kachin state. The number of IDPs increased as the conflict spread to other parts of Kachin state and Northern Shan state where KIA had military bases. Given that the majority of the displaced communities are subsistence farmers, in the initial phases of the displacement, a significant proportion of the people fleeing tried to remain in the vicinity of their villages and farms to protect their sources of livelihoods. This behaviour became progressively more dangerous and unsustainable, eventually obliging people to abandon their fields and cattle. With displacement becoming protracted, more IDPs are now moving again to camps or areas close to their villages of origin so as to be able to farm, despite mine risks and risks of encountering soldiers/armed elements.

The displacement context is markedly different between Kachin and Northern Shan States. Kachin State saw IDPs flee and remain in camps in both Government Controlled Areas (GCA) and Non-Government Controlled Areas (NGCA) following armed conflict close to their areas of origin. Many people in Northern Shan fled not only because of direct exposure to conflict but also due to the associated pressures caused by the proliferation of armed groups in the area including the perpetration of various violations such as forced portering and recruitment,[[29]](#footnote-29) extortion, harassment, gender based violence and arbitrary detentions. Other communities have become so accustomed and normalized to conflict in their areas that they no longer displace during sporadic fighting.

### IDP communities in Kachin and Northern Shan

At the onset of the conflict, the majority of IDPs initially fled to NGCA.[[30]](#footnote-30) As of April 2015, approximately 92,000 people remain displaced including 85,000 people in 139 locations[[31]](#footnote-31) in Kachin and 7,100 people in 26 locations in Northern Shan.[[32]](#footnote-32) Out of 92,000 IDPs, the majority (55%) now lives in GCA. Local CBOs and faith based organizations where the first responders and up to now remain in most cases the principal service providers in the camps.

In GCA, approximately 44,600 IDPs live in camps, 5,700 live with host families and 150 live in boarding schools.[[33]](#footnote-33) IDPs in GCA receive regular assistance by the Government, national[[34]](#footnote-34) and international organisations.

In NGCA, about 38,300 IDPs live in camps, 2,700 with host families and 1,000 in boarding schools.[[35]](#footnote-35) Direct international assistance in NGCA is limited due to government’s restrictions to humanitarian access. Local Kachin NGOs are the only regular source of assistance to these areas, with some international support. Often reported as being affiliated to the KIO, IDPs that reside in NGCA are under control of the KIO[[36]](#footnote-36), who has facilitated the work of local organisations.[[37]](#footnote-37) Despite the efforts of local civil society organizations, not all needs have been attended to and access limitations for international organisations have resulted in a variation in the quality and quantity of assistance provided to IDPs within GCA, compared to those in NGCA.[[38]](#footnote-38) Most of the camps in the NGCA are located in remote and hard-to-reach areas.

Of all 165 IDP locations in GCA and NGCA in Kachin and Northern Shan, the majority[[39]](#footnote-39) (97 out of 165) are in or near (less than 5km) urban areas. Out of the total number of IDP locations, 43 are small locations of less than 100 persons, sometimes only comprising a handful of families*.*

On average, each IDP household comprises 4.8 individuals in Kachin and 4.3 individuals in Northern Shan. The majority of IDPs are women and children. Men are usually out of the camps in search of livelihoods. Many of them are either recruited in the armed groups, have low-skilled jobs in mining or construction works, or are back in the village where they cultivate the family land. Sometimes, they work across the border in China. Their prolonged absence has implications in terms of women’s sense of safety and security but also impacts on changes in gender relations and responsibilities.

A 2014 report on the situation of older people, covering camps in Myitkyina and Bhamo, Kachin State, identified that among the elderly living in camps, 80% are women. Close to 68% of these elderly women are widows and 70% of all elderly women raise grandchildren (against respectively 30% widowers and 40% of all elderly men raising grandchildren).[[40]](#footnote-40)

Camp committees in both GCA and NGCA are mostly managed by non-IDPs, limiting the participation and voice of IDPs, including women and children in camp governance and reinforcing dependency and hierarchical structures. In NGCA the camp committees are managed by the IRRC, a department of the KIO. In GCA a mix of faith-based organizations and host community leaders form the camp committee governance structure.

1. The Panglong Agreement 1947. Accessed 22 December 2014 at Reignited conflict

   <http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/panglong_agreement.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Myanmar Peace Monitor. Accessible at: <http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/stakeholders-overview/167-ssa-n> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Myanmar Peace Monitor. Accessible at: <http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/myanmar-peace-center/204-mndaa> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Myanmar Peace Monitor. Accessible at: <http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/myanmar-peace-center/156-tnla> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Myanmar produces high quality jade, which accounts for billions of dollars in revenue annually. Most of the stones come from Hpakant in Kachin, where more than 7,000 mines sites have been allotted through government concessions. The Irrawaddy, 20 March 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Thant Myint-U, Where China meets India: Burma and the new crossroads of Asia. 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Carl Grundy-Warr and Elaine Wong – Geopolitics of drugs and cross-border relations: Burma-Thailand. International Boundaries Research Unit University of Durham, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Spring 2001 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy – The border as a trafficking interface in the Golden Triangle, L’Espace Politique, 24/ 2014-3, on line since 12 January 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Myanmar Rule of Law Assessment, March 2013. Available at: <http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Myanmar-Rule-of-Law-Assessment-3-5-13.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. President Office Notification No. 22/2015 of 26 February 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Myanmar is in the process of signing the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict as well. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. UNDP – Local Governance Mapping: The state of Local Governance: Trends in Kachin, 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. UNDP – Local Governance Mapping: The state of Local Governance: Trends in Kachin, 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2014 <http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/myanmar/2014/myanmar-comprehensive-solutions-needed-for-recent-and-long-term-idps-alike> [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Irrawaddy, Fighting Spreads Through Northern Shan State, Displacing Hundreds of Civilians, 25 February 2015 <http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/fighting-spreads-northern-shan-state-displacing-hundreds-civilians.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. UNHCR 2014 - Kim Jolliffe Ceasefires and durable solutions in Myanmar: a lessons learned review <http://www.unhcr.org/533927c39.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Irrawaddy, NCCT Leader: Federalism Proposals Should Include Ethnic Army Guarantees, 11 May 2015 <http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/ncct-leader-federalism-proposals-should-include-ethnic-army-guarantees.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Myanmar Peace Monitor: <http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/myanmar-peace-center/192-ncct> [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. WLB 2014 - Same Impunity, Same Patterns 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. The Tatmadaw consists of the army (Tatmadaw Kyi), the navy (Tatmadaw Yay) and air force (Tatmadaw Lay), but is dominated by the army. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See also: Mary Callahan, 2003, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma; Cornell [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. ICG 2014 – Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Barracks [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. ICG 2014 – Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Barracks pp.12 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. OHCHR, 2 April 2014. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomas Ojea Quintana. (A/HRC/25/64). Accessed at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/129/94/PDF/G1412994.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. The Asia Foundation, Kim Jolliffe, 2014, Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar’s Contested Regions [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. UNHCR 2014 - Kim Jolliffe Ceasefires and durable solutions in Myanmar: a lessons learned review <http://www.unhcr.org/533927c39.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Having a more distanced relationship with the KIO (due to language and culture) than the Kachin and feeling less obliged to serve with the KIA, a large part of the Lisu population have settled in IDP camps in GCA in southern Kachin not because of threats during armed confrontations in their areas of origin but because they fled KIA forced recruitment waves. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Reflecting Humanitarian Response – A Kachin IDPs Relief Monitoring Report 2014

    <http://kachinlandnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/IDP-Relief-Monitoring-Report-2014-1.pdf>) [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Locations include: camps, host families and boarding schools. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. These figures do not include displacements, which took place in the Special Administrative Zone of Kokang, Northern Shan, in early 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. CCCM Cluster data, April 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. See the list of local humanitarian organisations working on Kachin and Northern Shan IDP relief in *Annex 3.* [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. CCCM Cluster data, April 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Reflecting Humanitarian Response – A Kachin IDPs Relief Monitoring Report 2014

    <http://kachinlandnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/IDP-Relief-Monitoring-Report-2014-1.pdf>) [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. UNHCR 2014 - Commentary: IDPs and refugees in the current Myanmar peace process, Ashley South <http://www.unhcr.org/533927c39.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Reflecting Humanitarian Response – A Kachin IDPs Relief Monitoring Report 2014

    <http://kachinlandnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/IDP-Relief-Monitoring-Report-2014-1.pdf>) [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. More than 40,500 IDPs live in or near (less than 5km) urban areas [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. UNHCR funded HelpAge Report on the Situation of older people and their specific protection issues in Government Controlled Camps in Myitkyina and Bhamo, Kachin State, Myanmar. November 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-40)