

# Operational Plan 2011-2015 DFID BURMA

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### Introduction



The UK Government is determined to help reduce the inequalities of opportunity we see around the world today. We believe that promoting global prosperity is both a moral duty and in the UK's national interest. Aid is only ever a means to an end, never an end in itself. It is wealth creation and sustainable growth that will help people to lift themselves out of poverty.

In May 2010, the International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, commissioned the Bilateral Aid Review to take a comprehensive and ambitious look at the countries in which DFID works through our direct country and regional programmes. The review focussed on the best ways for the UK to tackle extreme poverty, ensuring that we make the greatest impact with every pound we spend. In parallel, through the Multilateral Aid Review, DFID assessed how effective the international organisations we fund are at tackling poverty.

On the 1st March 2011, the key outcomes of the reviews were announced, including the results that UK aid will deliver for the world's poorest people over the next four years. The Bilateral Aid Review has refocused the aid programme in fewer countries so that we can target our support where it will make the biggest difference and where the need is greatest. The Multilateral Aid Review findings enable us to put more money behind effective international organisations which are critical to delivering the UK's development priorities. In addition the independent Humanitarian Emergency Response Review looked at how the UK can build on its strengths in responding impartially to humanitarian needs and help ensure future disaster responses can be better prepared and coordinated.

DFID is committed to being a global leader on transparency. In the current financial climate, we have a particular duty to show that we are achieving value for every pound of UK taxpayers' money that we spend on development. Results, transparency and accountability are our watchwords and guide everything we do. DFID regards transparency as fundamental to improving its accountability to UK citizens and to improving accountability to citizens in the countries in which it works. Transparency will also help us achieve more value for money in the programmes we deliver and will improve the effectiveness of aid in reducing poverty.

The UK Aid Transparency Guarantee commits DFID to making our aid fully transparent to citizens in both the UK and developing countries. As part of this commitment we are publishing Operational Plans for country programmes. The Operational Plans set out the vision, priorities and results that will be delivered in each of our country programmes.

We will concentrate our efforts on supporting achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), creating wealth in poor countries, strengthening their governance and security and tackling climate change. The prize, in doing so, is huge: a better life for millions of people, and a safer, more prosperous world.

### 1) Context



The context in Burma has changed dramatically since this Plan was originally published. The elections in Burma in November 2010 – though widely seen as falling significantly short of international standards - started a remarkable process of change in the country. Key points in this include: the convening of a largely civilian Parliament in April 2011, which has since enacted a series of economic and political reforms; the signing of ceasefire agreements with all but one of the ethnic armed groups in early 2012; and by-elections in April in which Aung San Suu Kyi's (ASSK) National League for Democracy won 42 out of 44 seats. ASSK herself took her seat as an MP in Parliament in May 2012.

These changes are welcome and the UK has responded in a number of ways, including by:

- A visit by the Prime Minister, culminating in the suspension of EU sanctions in April.
- Stepping up engagement with reformers in government and continued strong support for ASSK, opposition parties & ethnic groups.
- Developing a new programme and taking a lead role in using our aid & coordinating others to support reforms.

Yet fundamental challenges remain. In a region containing some of the fastest growing economies in the world, Burma remains one of the poorest countries in Asia. Data about poverty in Burma is difficult to obtain and some is unreliable, but there is evidence of widespread poverty and vulnerability. According to UNDP's 2010 household survey, a quarter of the population do not have enough money to meet their basic food and living needs. Where reliable data exists, it shows the country is off track to reach many of the Millennium Development Goals. It has some of the worst health indicators in Asia, and suffers amongst the highest rates of malaria, malnutrition (especially amongst children) and tuberculosis in the world.

Underlying ethnic tensions have the potential to spill back over into conflict. The impact of decades of conflict includes human rights abuses, severe poverty and displacement. An estimated half a million people are still internally displaced in eastern Burma alone, and 140,000 continue to live in refugee camps in Thailand.

Economic and social reforms agreed by Parliament have so far failed to release the country's huge economic potential. A particular challenge will be to broaden out the country's modest economic growth, largely as a result of the discovery and exploitation of natural gas, to bring benefits for the large number of poor people. The agricultural sector, once the rice basket of the region, and still the main source of income for 70% of the population, remains unproductive, uncompetitive and low-value and there is a growing number of landless people (15 million) dependent on seasonal, non-farm work which is inadequate across the year. The benefits from natural resources such as oil, gas, mining and timber are controlled by a small elite. The banking sector is weak and over regulated, the country's majority rural population cannot access the credit they need and the small private sector is starved of finance and hamstrung by unreliable infrastructure and red-tape.

For the first time in years, Parliament debated the budget for 2012/13. Whilst this showed welcome increases in social spending (a doubling in health and a quadrupling in education), investment in basic services for the people remains extremely low by international standards (and still lags far behind spending on the military). Skills in public administration at all levels have been in decline for 20-30 years. A key question now is whether the state machinery can deliver its leaders' reform priorities, or if years of military-style command and control decision making will make systemic change impossible.

There are clear signs that aid from the international community is set to increase. The World and the Asian Development Banks have plans to return and have started early analytical work & technical assistance (though lending programmes are likely to be still some way off). Since 2004, the UK has led the way in demonstrating how higher levels of aid can make a real difference to poor people in Burma without supporting the regime. The great opportunity we now have is to start to work – cautiously - with government. As one of the few donors with a permanent presence in Burma, our expert staff play a critical role in ensuring what aid is given is used effectively.

### 2) Vision



#### **Overview**

A resource rich Burma that is accountable to its people and open to responsible foreign investment has great potential to reverse years of decline. Our aim will be to harness this potential - to help create a better governed, more peaceful & prosperous Burma that uses its increased wealth to reduce poverty.

To support this transformation we will base our support around five key pillars:

- •Good governance and public financial management
- Promoting responsible investment
- Improving transparency
- Strengthening the work of parliament
- •Helping the process of ethnic reconciliation.

In addition to new programmes covering these areas, our ongoing investments – which are on track to the deliver the significant results we set out a year ago – will also have a greater focus on these five pillars.

The UK-led suspension in April 2012 of EU sanctions on aid allows us to start a new partnership and dialogue with the government. Yet none of our aid will be provided through central government, only through United Nations organisations, trusted international & local NGOs and, where circumstances allow, at the township level. We will continue to support efforts to develop national and local strategies that meet people's development needs, and that people have had a say in designing. Where those strategies exist, we will align our support with them.

#### Alignment to DFID and wider UK Government priorities

Development is a key part of UK government policy towards Burma. This plan has been developed in close coordination with the Foreign Office (FCO).

- •Our plan targets key new areas of democratic governance, transparency/ accountability, prosperity and security .
- •Our programmes will be designed not only to meet basic needs, but to maximise their contribution to longer-term changes that address the root causes of conflict and fragility in Burma.
- •Our plan has a strong focus on girls and women, with targeted interventions to reduce maternal mortality and increase women's access to credit. A Gender Annex gives further details of this part of our strategy.
- •As part of the Bilateral Aid Review we decided not to take forward new work on climate change in the immediate future, in light of other priorities and the limited scope to achieve tangible results. Several of our programmes contribute to climate change mitigation or adaptation, and some do both.

#### What we will stop doing

- •We will stop our post-Cyclone Nargis relief programmes (£5m in 09/10 10/11) and focus on longer-term recovery programmes in the Cyclone-affected areas.
- •Two of the multi-donor funds we supported in 09/10 (Three Diseases Fund; UNICEF Education Fund) will be redesigned and strengthened to achieve greater results.

### 3) Results



### **Headline results**

Pillar/ Strategic Priority	Indicator	Baseline (including year)	Expected Results (including year)
Wealth Creation	Number of development finance organisations that commit capital or attract private investment into Burma.	Nil at 2012 (Output indicator)	2 by 2015
Wealth Creation/ Poverty, Hunger & Vulnerability	Number of women reached with access to financial services as a result of DFID support.	Nil at 2010 (Output indicator)	110,000 women by 2015
Governance & Security	Improvement in political rights and civil liberties, as measured by Freedom House.	"Not Free" in 2012	"Partially Free" in 2015
Governance & Security	Number of people supported to have choice and control over their own development, through DFID support.	Nil at 2010 (Output indicator)	<b>94,000 people by 2015</b> (inc. 76,000 women).
MDGs – Health	Number of unintended pregnancies averted, through DFID funding.	Nil at 2010 (Output indicator)	153,000 unintended pregnancies averted, by the end of 2014.
MDGs – Health	Number of women and men who receive appropriate treatment to contain the spread of drug-resistant malaria, through DFID funding.	Nil at 2010 (Output indicator)	<b>500,000 (Cumulative to end of 2014).</b> 250,000 women, 250,000 men.
MDGs – Education	Number of girls and boys assisted to overcome barriers to accessing and completing primary school, through DFID support.	Nil at 2010 (Output indicator)	<b>227,000 children by 2015</b> (113,500 girls and 113,500 boys)
MDGs - Humanitarian	Number of people in conflict-affected communities supported with humanitarian aid, through DFID support.	52,000 people by 2010 (27,000 women & girls, 25,000 men & boys)	155,000 people by 2014 (80,000 women & girls, 75,000 men & boys)

### 3) Results (continued)



#### **Evidence supporting results**

The availability of good quality evidence in Burma is generally low. Our ability to engage in large scale, systematic data collection and impact assessment is limited due to capacity constraints and access restrictions. Because data is difficult to obtain and some national data is unreliable, our headline results refer to the direct results of UK-funded programmes, measured through programmes' own monitoring & evaluation (M&E) systems, rather than national data on impact. Our plan is based on the experience of several years of expansion of our aid, which has shown that it is possible to deliver aid, to achieve results and meet needs despite the difficult context. Based on this experience, the results presented in this framework are realistic and achievable, based on partner estimates of what their programmes can deliver, as long as there is no major deterioration in the humanitarian situation, and subject to the detailed design of new programmes.

The evidence supporting our proposed <u>investment</u> indicator is straightforward. None of the major finance organisations (CDC, Private Infrastructure Development Group, the Asian Development Bank, International Finance Corporation and the World Bank) currently invest capital resources in Burma. The changing of their mandate (at the appropriate political moment) and the presence of operations in Burma are both observable. Further targets, relating to volume of capital committed and attracted in and to the number of local businesses reached, will be developed during the Operational Plan period. We are supporting analytical work by the World Bank on public financial management and the investment climate to generate baseline evidence for the economy.

Our main investment to reduce poverty, hunger & vulnerability (a multi-donor livelihoods fund) has generated good results to date and been designed with robust M&E systems built in to measure the impact of more innovative work. In health, the emergence of artemisinin-resistant malaria is a threat to global malaria control. The country has developed a strategy in response to the threat called the Myanmar Artemisinin Resistance Containment Framework (MARC) which includes a common M&E framework.

The Freedom House indicator is a reasonable overall indicator of progress on <u>democratic governance</u>, political rights, and accountability. There is evidence of impact on communities from long-standing <u>governance</u> and <u>security</u> programmes by UNDP and NGOs. This shows the benefits that self-reliance group membership has had on women's economic opportunities and on their ability to influence community decision making. Support for larger voluntary organisations or networks and coalitions has started more recently, but has shown that it is possible to strengthen the effectiveness of such groups and in some cases to influence policy. Systems for independently monitoring the impact of our work on <u>education</u> are well established and provide reliable data.

The quality of evidence supporting our proposed <u>humanitarian</u> aid is mixed. The impact of aid to refugees is relatively easy to measure by NGOs working in the camps. Aid to communities inside Burma affected by conflict is less easy to measure, as access to these areas is more restricted.

### Value for money rationale

Given the uncertain political situation and levels of fragility, investment in Burma carries a significant level of risk. But the potential rewards of successful investments are also significant, given the high levels of need and the relatively low levels of aid per capita. Our aid has also 'leveraged' in more significant funding and so increased impact (for example our investments in the Three Diseases Fund helped secure the return of the Global Fund for HIV, TB & Malaria, which will significantly improve results in tackling these diseases). Results identified in this plan have been prioritised on the basis of:

- The significant levels of need, and the benefits that can be delivered to Burma's people, which outweigh the costs.
- The potential global impact of aid to Burma particularly the containment of the emergence of drug-resistant malaria.
- The potential to leverage other resources by working together with other government and private donors to develop programmes that they can fund.
- The potential for different activities to contribute to longer-term processes of peace-building, democracy & accountability and to giving people a greater say in their own development.
- Attention to a balanced portfolio of large, multi-donor funds and smaller, more flexible aid modalities.

### 4) Delivery and Resources



The DFID Burma team comprises a decentralised office with UK and local staff in the British Embassy in Rangoon and support staff in Bangkok and Hanoi. Officials in Rangoon work closely with Foreign Office, UKTI & British Council colleagues. The team in Rangoon is further supported by staff in London to respond to the considerable public and political interest which Burma attracts. London staff also provide technical advice on social development, statistics and results. To deliver the Operational Plan we have already brought in new staff with a range of technical expertise and will continue to strengthen the team over the coming years.

Partnerships are key to DFID's effectiveness in Burma. They enable DFID to enhance its impact and extend its influence. At the moment all DFID resources are channelled through third parties, primarily the UN, the British Council and NGOs; none goes through central Government systems. DFID has been successful in leveraging donor resources for key development priorities. We have provided the leadership to construct multi-donor funding mechanisms into which others have contributed. Examples include the Three Diseases Fund and our work on health, livelihoods and education in the Irrawaddy Delta following Cyclone Nargis. Our share of overall development assistance to Burma is high in terms of aid volumes (we estimate that the UK has been the largest bilateral donor for a number of years, though ODA figures to Burma are unreliable) and higher still in terms of policy and programme leadership. The recent political changes have resulted in many new bilateral and multilateral donors, including the World Bank, wanting to work in Burma. We are playing a key role in coordinating this influx, avoiding duplication of effort, ensuring the government is not inundated with offers of assistance that it cannot manage and, above all, using the expertise we have built up in Burma to ensure aid reaches the poorest and achieves maximum impact. Despite these new actors we still are likely to remain in the top four or five of funders in the medium term, alongside the EC, Australia and possibly Japan and the US.

The two key UN delivery partners for us are UNICEF and UNDP. In both cases, our assessments locally match those of the 2010 Multilateral Aid Review (MAR). UNICEF demonstrates strong delivery in this fragile environment. UNDP plays an important governance and gender role within its restricted mandate. Both of these organisations could work more effectively with other each other and parts of the UN and we will press them to improve this. A significant proportion of our scaling up will potentially be channelled through the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) which was not assessed as part of the MAR. Maintaining its effectiveness will be a priority for us.

Our number of staff (we have the largest donor mission in-country) means that we have the capacity and some responsibility to provide technical and policy leadership. Support on maternal & child health and to strengthened civil society are good examples. UK leadership is appreciated by others and helps to extend wider UK influence. However, it also imposes greater demands on DFID programme staff and these are reflected in our proposals for organisational design.

The suspension of EU sanctions in April 2012, including those on aid delivery, has opened up to us a wider choice of aid instruments and we have the chance now to develop additional options. For example, we are conducting a World Bank assessment of the Government's financial management as a first step in considering how we might strengthen government resource allocation & delivery systems.

### 4) Delivery and Resources (continued)



#### **Planned Programme Spend**

Pillar/Strategic priority	2010/	<b>/</b> 11	2011/	/12	2012	/13	2013/	<b>/14</b>	2014/	15	TOTAL 2	011-15
	Resource	Capital	Resource	Capital	Resource	Capital	Resource	Capital	Resource	Capital	Resource	Capital
	£'000,000	£'000	£'000,000	£'000	£'000,000	£'000	£'000,000	£'000	£'000,000	£'000	£'000,000	£'000
Wealth Creation	2	0	10	0	6	0	8	0	5	0	28	0
Governance and Security	2	0	2	0	4	0	5	0	5	0	16	0
Education	2	0	3	0	3	0	3	0	2	0	10	0
Reproductive, Maternal												
and Newborn Health	2	0	3	0	11	0	19	0	26	0	58	0
Malaria	4	0	3	0	5	0	11	0	10	0	30	0
HIV/Aids	6	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	2	0	4	0
Other Health	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Poverty, Hunger and												
Vulnerability	3	0	8	0	4	0	3	0	3	0	19	0
Humanitarian	8	0	5	0	6	0	4	0	5	0	20	0
TOTAL	32	0	36	0	40	0	55	0	56	0	187	0

Figures for 2010/11 to 2014/15 are the planning figures to the end of the Spending Review period as previously published. The 2012/13 planning figures have been updated to take account of revisions agreed by Ministers when annual budgets were finalised, The 2013/14 and 2014/15 planning figures will be

subject to revision under future budget cycles

### 4) Delivery and Resources (continued)



#### **Efficiency savings**

Delivering Programme Efficiencies						
		Residual cost				
		in the SR				
Category	Details	period £'000				
Strategic Reprioritisation	The Delta regiona will remain a geographical focus for DFID Burma. How ever, support to communities affected by Cyclone Nargis in 2008 will be mainstreamed within larger programmes over the Plan period.	5793				

#### Administrative cost savings

Over the course of this Operational Planning period our programme will almost double. To support delivery of this increase the number of full-time equivalent Frontline staff will also double. Frontline costs will therefore increase over the Plan period from £767,000 in 2010/11 to £2.319m in 2014/15. This reflects a higher proportion of UK based staff in-country and the increasing costs of staff being based in Rangoon. DFID Burma's administration budget will increase from £61,000 in 2010/11 to £280,000 in 2014/15. We will continue to closely monitor energy usage and staff travel to identify where we can further bring down individual staff's associated costs.

DFID Burma is co-located with the Foreign Office and British Council at the British Embassy in Rangoon. We share most of our administrative and office services with the FCO with charges largely determined through a centrally negotiated Service Level Agreement. A small number are negotiated locally. We do not foresee being able to provide FCO with any services. We will explore scope for additional administrative efficiencies but these may be limited.

### 5) Delivering Value for Money



DFID Burma works in a challenging, unpredictable environment, and its programmes are subject to high levels of scrutiny. So delivery of value for money is already a high priority. By balancing risk and diversifying our portfolio; working through a mixture of large-scale multi donor trust funds, UN agencies, international NGOs and local NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs), we have demonstrated that aid can deliver results in Burma for the poor people who most need it. Within the donor community DFID Burma leads the way in demanding greater clarity of measurement of results, and improving value for money.

There are **challenges** to delivering this agenda over the operational plan period:

- •Burma is a fragile state with a young reform process where the costs of delivering aid can be relatively high.
- •Access restrictions on UN and international NGOs are still in place to specific geographical areas, which limit both the scope for competition between implementing partners and the scope for those partners to drive down unit costs by working at scale.
- •Limited access to areas affected by conflict makes measurement of impact challenging. But these are the areas with some of the greatest humanitarian need.
- Although there have been improvements in data transparency and a census is planned for 2014, national data remains incomplete and of variable quality.
- •In spite of an increasing focus on economics and measuring economic impact, there remains limited economic capacity to do this in-country
- •Measurement of the value of our work is difficult where the impact and outcomes do not lend themselves to quantification of benefits for example development of more democratic and accountable institutions.
- •We are expanding into new areas and so there will be a lead time as we build up our skills and knowledge and develop partnerships with organisations that have complementary skills

#### Actions

DFID Burma will strengthen its capacity to deliver value for money.

- •In 2011/12, we recruited a full-time economist based in Rangoon and a shared Evaluation Advisor based in Hanoi. This has increased our capacity on economic appraisal and evaluation
- •In 2012/13, in line with the workforce plan, we will recruit new advisors in health, conflict, governance and the private sector which will enable us to make better programme decisions in key areas.

With these new resources and the existing resources in the team, we will:

- •Build on our strong value for money analysis and take additional steps to integrate this into all stages of programme management.
- •Implement our value for money framework to improve our ability to assess the impact of the programme and identify ways of further improving value for money
- •Continue to identify areas subject to strict criteria on accountability, governance and transparency where by working closely with Government or working through national systems we can deliver real improvements for poor people, economies of scale and greater value for money
- •Continue to design monitoring and evaluation frameworks that include targets and indicators for driving down implementing partners' unit costs.
- •Enhance, as planned, our use of local knowledge and experience in our programmes, to drive down the unit costs of that expertise

DFID Burma will continue to seek opportunities to strengthen value for money in its own **operations**. We will:

- •Assess options for sharing more services with the FCO in ways that deliver real cost savings and efficiencies
- •Negotiate annually with the FCO locally to ensure a good deal for DFID for services provided under our local service agreement.
- •Continue to conduct competitive tendering for contracts for goods and services procured locally and identify ways of bringing in further expertise on procurement from within DFID and externally.
- •Continue to proactively manage and monitor delivery of our learning and develop plan objectives to ensure spend to budget.
- Continue rigorously monitoring staff travel to ensure opportunities to conduct meetings via telephone or video conference are maximised.

### 6) Monitoring and Evaluation



#### **Monitoring**

How. Each of our programmes will have an appropriate monitoring framework with key indicators linked to the Operational Plan Results Framework. Selected programmes have a separate output on M&E to ensure sufficient funding and arrangements for effective M&E. In the large multi-donor funds we will build on the progress we've made in ensuring DFID's standards, and particularly our 'logical frameworks', are adopted by all partners. Implementing agencies will be responsible for continuous day-to-day monitoring of progress. We will involve independent external reviewers at appropriate intervals through the life of the programme. Regular field visits undertaken by DFID Burma staff, in particular utilising the experience and insights of our local staff, will allow us to report on the impact on the ground.

Who. Overall responsibility for monitoring will sit with the DFID Burma Programme Team, working with Advisers. These resources will be augmented by external expertise when necessary. The Team will liaise closely with partners on their monitoring activities, ensuring that good quality reporting is provided to agreed timetables.

When. Monitoring is a continuous process. We will continue to rigorously track reporting timetables and proactively engage with partners to ensure that good quality information is provided to DFID Burma.

What. We will monitor programme progress against key deliverables, and develop a framework to assess their impact against longer term, transformational criteria.

#### **Evaluation**

DFID Burma's capacity in evaluation has been strengthened significantly with 50% of an Evaluation Adviser based in Hanoi, Vietnam. An Evaluation Plan has been developed and agreed with the following priorities:

- To ensure DFID Burma designs better, more cost effective interventions based on high quality and timely evaluations of our programmes and learn lessons.
- To ensure that 1-5% of new programme expenditure will be allocated to evaluation and to wider investment in monitoring and assessment of results. All DFID's major programmes including the 3 MDG Fund, the LIFT and the new Refugee/ IDP Programme will be independently evaluated.
- To ensure all of our partners plan and budget for appropriate evaluations when designing programmes, that these are independent wherever possible; and actions are taken to address recommendations.
- To peer review and quality assure all major evaluations, including using DFID Evaluation Department's Support Services and Agreement Framework;
- To develop an approach to process evaluation that can measure the contribution our programmes make to the changes that are important for the longer-term development of Burma.
- To share the lessons learnt from these evaluations across the DFID network, government & civil society counterparts and donors;

#### **Building capacity of partners**

The variable quality of national statistics means we do not generally rely on them for monitoring purposes. We will continue to support opportunities to collect better survey data where they arise, and draw on the services of a Results Adviser to assess the quality of data from surveys that are planned and carried out. Where national data are not reliable, we will ensure our partners gather sufficient programme-level data to show the impact of the programme activities.

We will continue to support implementing partners in their efforts to secure access for monitoring, data collection and independent analysis, and to analyse this data. The Education, Health and Livelihoods/ economic sectors will be priorities for this work, but we will also develop more innovative M&E tools to measure the impact of our support for civil society.

### 7) Transparency



Transparency is one of the top priorities for the UK Government. We will ensure that we continue to meet our commitments under the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee including publishing detailed information about DFID projects, including programme documents and all spend above £500. We will continue to ensure that information is accessible, comparable, accurate, timely and in a common standard with other donors and that we provide opportunities for those directly affected by our projects to provide feedback.

#### DFID Burma will take the following actions to ensure DFID meets its commitments in the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee:

We will publish detailed information of all new programmes on the DFID website where this does not put local partners at risk (see below). Annual project performance reporting and end of project evaluation will also be published for programmes approved from 2011 onwards. Annual project performance reporting and end of project evaluation from April 2011 will also be published.

As well as publishing this Operational Plan in English, the updated Sections 1-4 will be translated into Burmese. This is the first language of around two thirds of the people of Burma, is understood by most of the remainder, and is taught in local schools from an early age. We will consider the need for translation of specific project information into other languages, where there is a particular need to do so – for example for a public education project to reach a particular target group. In these cases our implementing partners would make arrangements for translation to local languages.

DFID Burma will promote access to information in Burma in other ways too, for example in partnership with the BBC Media Access Trust. A long-standing priority is to make our aid accessible to local civil society organisations and we continue to input into the Embassy's communication materials such as the *UK in Burma* website.

We will meet the standards set out in the International Aid Transparency Initiative, and encourage our partners in civil society, multilateral organisations and other donors to do the same. We will ensure that large multi-donor funds to which we contribute make relevant information available on their website: the two largest funds that we currently support already do so. We will continue to maximise opportunities to support greater government transparency. We have, for example, begun work with the World Bank on an assessment of the government's financial systems and have facilitated contact between government and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

We will not insist on transparency where it could endanger the safety and security of our implementing agencies or their beneficiaries. In all cases we will seek and be guided by implementing partners' and communities' view on what sorts of transparency would not compromise their security.

We will increase opportunities for feedback by those benefiting from DFID programmes. The major Trust Funds we support (3MDG Fund, LIFT, MDEF) have established processes for feedback from Implementing Partners. Internet access and mobile phone coverage in Burma are very limited, but if they improve in future DFID will investigate options for building feedback from beneficiaries by internet or SMS into our programme monitoring.

DFID does not have a dedicated communications officer in Rangoon. However we will allocate dedicated staff to ensure accurate and timely input of all relevant documentation and data. The requirement to meet our transparency obligations will be included in individual Job Objectives and individual performance will be assessed annually. Further support will be provided by the team in London.

### **Annex 1: Results Progress**

## Department for International

### Progress towards headline results – one year on\*

Pillar/ Strategic Priority	Indicator	Baseline (including year)	Progress towards results (including year)	Expected Results (including year)
Health	Number of women and men who receive appropriate treatment to contain the spread of drug resistant malaria through DFID funding	Nil (2010)	178,000 (end 2011)	500,000 (end 2014); of which 250,000 women and 250,000 men
Health	Number of pregnant women who receive at least 4 antenatal care visits as a result of DFID funding	Nil (2010)	Too early to report results; the 3 MDG Fund, which will contribute directly to this target, was approved in April 2012.	57,500 women (2015)
Health	Number of unintended pregnancies averted through DFID funding	Nil (2010)	Too early to report results; the 3 MDG Fund, which will contribute directly to this target was approved in April 2012.	153,000 unintended pregnancies averted (end 2014)
Wealth Creation/ Poverty, Hunger and Vulnerability	Number of women with access to financial services as a result of DFID support	Nil (2010)	11,400 (end 2011)	110,000 women (2015)
Wealth Creation	Number of women and men who have produced more food through DFID support	Nil (2010)	34,500 ( end 2011)	74,000 men, 18,000 women (2015)
Education	Number of girls and boys assisted to overcome barriers to accessing and completing primary school through DFID support	Nil (2010)	33,600 (end 2011) of which 16,800 girls and 16,800 boys	227,000 children (2015) of which 113,500, girls and 1113,500 boys
Humanitarian	Number of people in conflict affected communities supported with humanitarian aid through DFID support	52,000 people (2010) of which 27,000 women and girls and 25,000 men and boys	86,600 (end 2011) of which 31,900 women and 54,700 men	155,000 people (2014) of which 80,000 women and girls and 75,000 men and boys
Governance and Security	Number of people supported to have choice and control over their own development through DFID support	Nil (2010)	36,900 (end 2011) of which 30,200 women and 6,700 men	94,000 people (2015) of which 76,000 women and 18,000 men

<sup>\*</sup> These results may not be directly aggregatable with other country results due to different measurement methodologies