About this report

Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor provide research for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) formed in 1992 to rid the world of the scourge of the anti-personnel landmine. The ICBL is a network of over 1,300 non-governmental organizations in 70 countries, and received the Nobel Peace Award in 1997. The Cluster Munition Coalition is an international civil society campaign working to eradicate cluster munitions, prevent further casualties from these weapons and put an end for all time to the suffering they cause.

Landmine Monitor documents the implementation of the 1997 Ottawa Convention, or the Mine Ban Treaty. Cluster Munition Monitor documents the implementation of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. Both Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor assess the efforts of the international community to resolve the crisis caused by these weapons.

As of 1 October 2012, 160 countries, over 80% of the world’s governments, have ratified or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty and 111 countries have signed or ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Myanmar/Burma is not one of them. In 2011 it remained the only country in the world whose armed forces regularly used anti-personnel landmines.

This Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor annual report on Myanmar/Burma is combined from the annual country reports contained within the Landmine Monitor Report 2012 and Cluster Munition Monitor Report 2012.

Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor is not a technical treaty verifications system or a formal inspection regime. It is an effort by ordinary people to hold governments accountable to non-use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions. It is meant to compliment the reporting requirements of countries which have ratified the treaty. Our reports also seek to make transparent the state of the landmine and cluster munition crisis, and government policies or practices, in non-signatory states.

Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor aims to promote and facilitate discussion within human societies in order to reach the goal of a landmine and cluster munition free world.

Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about the issue it is monitoring in order to benefit the world as a whole. It is critical, but constructive in its documentation and analysis.

Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor Myanmar/Burma researcher for 2012 was Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan. We are grateful to all the organizations and individuals who provide information for this report each year, and acknowledge their contribution within the report. We encourage contributions sent to assist in our documentation on these issues. Please contact us at: burma@icblcm.org. If you have corrections regarding information as it is presented within this report please write: monitor@icblcm.org

Cover photo Aung Khin (76) sits in his house near Three Pagodas Pass on the border with Thailand. Aung Khin stepped on an antipersonnel mine 46 years ago. “I was the first person to step on a mine near my village. Everyone in my village was shocked to know that we had mines around us.” | Photo courtesy of Giovanni Diffidenti/Di+ onlus

Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor Myanmar/Burma
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Myanmar/Burma

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Mine ban policy

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar\(^1\) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. On 30 March 2011, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military junta that ruled the country since 1988, dissolved and handed power to a new government dominated by the military-sponsored Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP).\(^2\)

Myanmar was one of 17 countries that abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 66/29 on 2 December 2011, which called for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has abstained on similar annual resolutions since 1997.

In July 2012, Minister of Foreign Affairs U Wunna Maung Lwin told the president of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that Myanmar was considering accession to the Mine Ban Treaty as part of its state reforms. The treaty’s Implementation Support Unit also reported that the minister said his government is no longer using landmines and is pursuing a peace pact with non-state armed groups which would include banning the weapon.\(^3\)

Myanmar attended the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh November–December 2011, making a statement at a treaty meeting for the first time.\(^4\) Myanmar previously attended meetings of States Parties in 2003 and in 2006. It has never attended an intersessional meeting of the convention. It made one of its most detailed

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\(^1\) Formerly called the Union of Myanmar. Previously, the military junta ruling the country changed the name from Burma to Myanmar. Many ethnic groups in the country, and a number of states, still refer to the country as Burma. Internal state and division names are given in their common form, or with the ruling Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) designation in parentheses, for example, Karenni (Kayah) state. Since 2009, the Monitor has used township names according to the UN Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU). See, www.themimu.info.

\(^2\) The USDP was previously a mass mobilization vehicle of the military regime, with junta leader Than Shwe as its patron. The USDP was placed in power through a controversial Constitution and electoral process which sidelined the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) from participation. However, in 2011 the government modified the electoral law and the NLD was registered. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD members successfully campaigned for seats in the bi-election of April 2012.


\(^4\) Most of the presentation by Myanmar focused on nuclear weapons, but in relation to antipersonnel mines Myanmar stated that self-defense in matters of national security of a state should be inclusively considered. Statement by Myanmar, Win Naing, Director General, International Organizations and Economic Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011.
statements on the mine ban at the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South East Asia in April 2009.\(^5\)

In February 2012, during visits by government delegations from Norway and Luxembourg, President TheinSein requested assistance for mine clearance. This was the first time that Myanmar requested bilateral assistance for mine action.\(^6\) According to the government-owned New Light of Myanmar, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed the desire to assist in mine clearance through cooperation with the UN Development Program.\(^7\)

The landmine issue was also raised in Myanmar’s national parliament and in the legislatures of some constituent states. In February 2012, in the Amyotha Hluttaw (the upper house of parliament), members U Bo Yel of Kayah/Karenni State, U Mahn Kan Nyunt of Kayin/Karen State, and U Hla Swe of Magway Division proposed that mine clearance should be undertaken in support of peace talks occurring in ethnic areas, which could then be followed up by other development activities to improve health, education and livelihood. The proposal was adopted during that session of parliament but it is unclear what the decision means in practical terms.\(^8\)

On 10 February 2012, a Kayin State member of parliament raised a question in the Kayin State Parliament on behalf of constituents in six villages, all of whom are currently residing in Myaingbwe as internally displaced people. The member asked when and how the landmines in those villages could be removed so that his constituents could return to their homes. On 23 February, the State Minister of Security and Border Affairs stated that the landmines were in an area controlled by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), and that the Myanmar Army (commonly referred to by its Burmese acronym, Tatmadaw) had not laid mines there. The minister suggested that since the landmines must have been placed by the DKBA, the DKBA could ask for assistance from the government to remove the landmines.\(^9\)

In September 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar again urged Myanmar to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. He noted that he continues to receive disturbing reports of landmine use by both the government and non-state armed groups, and subsequent casualties throughout the country, and requested that the government of Myanmar “work with international organizations to develop a comprehensive

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\(^5\) At the workshop, Myanmar said, “Myanmar believes that the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines created the deaths and injuries to the innocent civilians in the affected areas. Transfers and exports of antipersonnel mines contribute to their proliferation and increase chances of an indiscriminate use consequently. Therefore, Myanmar maintains that a step-by-step approach would be most appropriate way to deal with the issue. We also believe that the transfer and exports of anti-personnel mines should be addressed together with the total ban on use of anti-personnel mines…. To establish mine control scheme in the remote and delicate areas, peace is the most essential element for us.” Statement by Kyaw Swe Tint, Director, International Organizations and Economic Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia, 3 April 2009.


\(^7\) “US wants to be Myanmar’s partner,” New Light of Myanmar (Nay Pyi Taw), 2 December 2011, p. 8. The Monitor could find no mention of this offer in the press releases covering the visit released by the US State Department.

\(^8\) “Third regular session of first Amyotha Hluttaw continues for fifth day,” New Light of Myanmar, 18 February 2012, p. 10. It is not known which agencies of government will be required to actualize this proposal.

\(^9\) Monitor interview with Min Aung Lin, Kayin state Parliamentarian for the Plong Sawae Democratic Party, Hpa-an, 17 February 2012; and follow up by telephone 7 March 2012. The constituents were from Masit, Pilagyi, Pisney, Pipanah, Piyajaw and Kyinbiew villages.
plan to end the use of landmines and to address their legacy, including the systematic removal of mines and rehabilitation of victims.”

In August 2011, Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana met with Union Minister for Defense Major General Hla Min and recommended that the Tatmadaw avoid landmine use. The Defense Minister stated it was insurgents who used landmines since they had no strength to face the Tatmadaw.

In March 2011, the chair of the National Democratic Force (NDF) informed the ICBL that his party’s policy was supportive of the mine ban, and that the NDF would raise the issue in parliament. In February 2011, a former commander-in-chief of the army stated to the ICBL “Mines must be banned according to both humanitarianism and religion in a civilized world.” Also in February 2011, Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, now a member of parliament, called on all combatants to “cease the way of mines” and all groups to “start to ban landmines in their operations without waiting for their opponent to start to do it.”

The Halt Mine Use in Burma/Myanmar campaign, which was launched by the ICBL in 2003, distributed 1,500 copies of the Burmese-language translation of the Myanmar Country Profile for 2011. The Monitor cooperated with the UN Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) in Yangon to produce an updated map of townships with identified mine contamination.


Since the publication of its first report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has consistently documented the extensive use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and by non-state armed groups (NSAG) in many areas of Burma/Myanmar. During this reporting period (from mid-2011 to mid-2012) however, information available to the Monitor indicates a lower level of incidence of new mine use and what use there is occurs in more limited geographic areas. It is unclear whether this is the beginning of a trend resulting from reforms occurring inside the country or other factors. One possibly positive step occurred in July 2012 when Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin claimed that government forces are no longer using landmines.

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12 ICBL meeting with Dr. Than Nyein, Chairman, NDF, and other central committee members of the NDF, Yangon, 2 March 2011. The NDF obtained some seats in Myanmar’s new parliament, elected in October 2010.
15 This is the fourth edition of the map which is available on the UN MIMU website, http://bit.ly/MjS08t.
In summary, there is only a single allegation of mine use by the Tatmadaw in Kachin State in October 2011, and the apparent use of mines into late 2011 by a new actor, former opposition combatants who have now been formed into government-controlled Border Guard Forces (BGF). There are no reports in 2012 concerning mine use by the Tatmadaw. Additionally, reports of mine use by opposition NSAG have diminished in the reporting period, with the only incidents of new use emerging from Kachin and Karen states. One troublesome trend observed is the use of, or fabrication of improvised mines by civilians.

**Government Forces**

Units of Myanmar’s army have laid mines in numerous parts of the country every year since the Monitor began reporting in 1999. The only allegation of use of antipersonnel mines by the Tatmadaw, in 2011, was in Kachin State, where Tatmadaw units were accused of laying mines in their armed conflict with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Human Rights Watch reported that the KIA encountered mines laid by the Myanmar army in Momauk township in October 2011. Additionally, in July 2011, the KIA claimed to have seized landmines from captured Tatmadaw soldiers.

In March 2012, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) called for mine risk education for people in camps due to reports of landmines in their villages of origin in Kachin State laid during armed conflict. In December 2011, the newly formed Myanmar National Human Rights Commission issued a report on investigations in Kachin State which stated, “The Commission urges the avoidance of the use of landmines which cause grievous harm to innocent civilians.” This was the first time an entity of government, albeit civilian and ostensibly independent, called for a halt to use of landmines.

**Border Guard Forces**

The government demanded that all ethnic armed groups transform themselves into Border Guard Forces (BGF) under the command of the Tatmadaw prior to the October 2010 election. Some armed groups did so. Although BGF are required to be under the control of the regional Tatmadaw commander, they maintain the force structures and areas of operation they had previously as an armed group. It is not clear how often BGF units are operate under Tatmadaw instructions or undertake independent activities. The newly organized BGF appear to have been using antipersonnel mines since that time.

On 3 January 2012, the local NGO the Free Burma Rangers (FBR) reported that BGF forces had told the villagers of Pra Day Mu Village, Hpapun Township, not to return to their village because of landmines the BGF had laid there.

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20 “Myanmar National Human Rights Commission issues statement,” *New Light of Myanmar*, 14 December 2011, p. 9. The report also noted that the State Government had been able to provide basic health facilities to victims of landmines, thereby saving their lives.
21 Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution requires that the many armed groups within the country’s ethnic areas be placed under national military command. To fulfill this obligation, the former SPDC regime demanded in April 2010 that all of the armed groups which had non-hostility pacts with the Tatmadaw be transformed into Border Guard Forces (BGF). The process of transformation required initial disarmament followed by the issuance of government weapons and organization of their troops to be subordinate to regional Tatmadaw military commanders. The requirement led to an increase in tensions across the country and armed conflict, particularly in Kachin State.
In October 2011, according to the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), a BGF unit laid mines near fields in Myawaddy Township to interdict movement by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU). One villager serving in the BGF stepped on one of the BGF-laid mines. The BGF reportedly stated that they were under orders to lay 500 mines in the area.23

In September 2011, the BGF reportedly laid mines in Htee Klay, Noh Kay, and T’poh Kyaw village tracts of Hpa-an Township. They also are alleged to have forced villagers to carry the mines as porters when they did so. Several farm animals were also killed by the mines.24 Villagers in Myawaddy Township also stated that both the KNLA and the BGF were laying mines in the area in September.25

In August 2011, villagers stated that the BGF laid landmines in eastern Hpaapun Township, leading to the deaths of at least four civilians, and that the villagers had been forced to be guides and clear mines for the BGF. The villagers state that the BGF laid 200-300 mines in the area.26

In January 2011, a unit of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, which had transformed into a BGF unit in southwest Hpaapun Township, was rotated out of the area, but it left behind mines it laid at the slope of a hill to prevent access to a gold mine. The landmines have prohibited access to fields of local farmers.27

Use by non-state armed groups

At least 17 NSAG have used antipersonnel mines since 1999. However, some of these groups have ceased to exist or no longer use mines. No armed group has renounced antipersonnel mine use in the last five years. Previously some armed groups unilaterally renounced the use of antipersonnel mines by signing the Deed of Commitment administered by the Swiss NGO Geneva Call.28 In March 2012, Geneva Call held a workshop on humanitarian mine action with the KNLA.29

The government announced its intention to seek peace agreements with armed groups during 2011. In November 2011, it met with four anti-government armed groups to launch discussions on a peace settlement. Since that time, several meetings have been held. The need for mine clearance has been mentioned in some of these meetings. And, as noted above, in July 2012, the foreign minister said that the government is pursuing peace agreements with all ethnic armed groups, which he stated would include banning mine use.30 However, a halt

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24 Ibid.
30 U Wunna Maung Lwin made these statements to the President of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Prak Sokhonn, on the margins of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh in July 2012. “Myanmar seriously considering landmine treaty as part of its state reforms,” Press Release, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
on new mine use has not been formally adopted by any side as part of a ceasefire as of 1 September 2012. Conflict, including mine warfare, by the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) and the use of mines in conflicts between different armed groups in Karen State has continued. For example, in April 2012 villagers in Myawaddy Township of Karen State stated to the KHRG that the KNLA was using mines near their villages.\(^{31}\)

In October 2010, the KIA released a statement that warned the public of mines laid as a result of increased tensions over the KIA’s refusal to transform into a BGF under central military command.\(^{32}\) In May 2011, state media reported the seizure by the army of 30 homemade antipersonnel mines in the possession of a member of the KIA in Myitkyina Township.\(^{33}\) In October and December 2011, the government claimed to have seized 17 mines of an unknown type, among other weapons, from the KIA during operations.\(^{34}\) State media also reported the recovery of mines during the surrender of members of the Shan State Army (SSA) and the KNLA in late 2011.\(^{35}\)

**Civilian mine use**

In some eastern zones of the country, there have been reports of use of mines by ordinary citizens and village guard groups. The KHRG has reported some use of antipersonnel mines by ordinary villagers, ostensibly to prevent the Tatmadaw’s entry into their villages. This practice is especially prevalent in four village tracts of northern Hpapun Township. Villagers in this area have stated their desire for access to landmines, according to the KHRG. Villagers have stated that the KNLA has provided them with materials for mines and instructions for mine construction, as well as some completed mines, but not enough for their needs. The KHRG attributes use of mines by villages in this particular area to the fact that they are surrounded on all sides by Tatmadaw military camps and have no other areas to which they can flee. The KHRG notes that in other areas, villagers are more likely to see mine use by any party as a threat to their well-being.

In March 2011, one villager in Ler Muh Bplaw village tract, in Hpapun Township, informed the KHRG that the villagers use mines in order to facilitate farming near the front line, close to Tatmadaw camps. “If the SPDC (Tatmadaw) soldiers step on a landmine when they come, they will go back after they were hit by the mine, or we can turn back [flee]. We do it for alertness.” When asked how many mines they had laid in that area the villagers replied “over a hundred.” Another villager, from the same village, stepped on a mine laid by the civilian village guards. He stated, “I went back and farmed my hill field at the front line and stepped on a landmine. I was hit by our people’s landmine. Not an SPDC Army landmine.”\(^{36}\) In October 2011, a villager in Hpapun Township described to KHRG how they used mines to prevent the Tatmadaw from entering their villages.

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\(^{34}\) “Military columns seize arms and ammunition, narcotic drugs, machinery for production of narcotic drugs in Muse District, Shan State,” *New Light of Myanmar*, 11 October 2011. p. 16; and “Five blasts occur between Htupu Station and Hshahw Station in Mogauung Tsp.,” *New Light of Myanmar*, 20 December 2011.


manufactured landmines from white and black gunpowder, but obtained detonators from others, in order to use the mines to prevent access by the Tatmadaw to their village.\(^{37}\)

### Production, stockpiling, and transfer

Myanmar Defense Products Industries (Ka Pa Sa), a state enterprise at Ngyaung Chay Dauk in western Pegu (Bago) division, produces fragmentation and blast antipersonnel mines, including a non-detectable variety.\(^{38}\) Authorities in Myanmar have not provided any information on the types and quantities of stockpiled antipersonnel mines. The Monitor has previously reported that, in addition to domestic production, Myanmar has obtained and used antipersonnel mines of Chinese, Indian, Italian, Soviet, and United States manufacture, as well as some mines whose origin has not been unidentified.\(^{39}\) Myanmar is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines.\(^{40}\)

### Non-state armed group production, transfer, and stockpiling

The KIO, KNLA, DKBA, Karenni Army, and the United Wa State Army have produced blast and fragmentation mines. Some also make Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines, mines with anti-handling fuzes, and explosive booby-traps. All units of the KNLA are reportedly able to manufacture and deploy bounding mines after training by a foreign technician.\(^{41}\) Armed groups in Myanmar have also acquired mines by removing mines laid by others, seizing Tatmadaw stocks, and obtaining mines from the clandestine arms market.\(^{42}\) Although some former combatants have non-hostility pacts with the ruling authorities, they have not disarmed and some still possess antipersonnel mines.\(^{43}\) In October 2011, the authorities announced that they had recovered landmines among other weapons in operations against the KIA.\(^{44}\)

### Mine Contamination and Impact

Mines are believed to be concentrated on Myanmar’s borders with Bangladesh and Thailand, but are a particular threat in eastern parts of the country as a result of decades of

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\(^{38}\) Myanmar produces the MM1, which is modeled on the Chinese Type-59 stake-mounted fragmentation mine; the MM2, which is similar to the Chinese Type-58 blast mine; a Claymore-type directional fragmentation mine; and a copy of the US M14 plastic mine.

\(^{39}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 938. The mines include: Chinese Types-58, -59, -69, -72A; Soviet POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, PMN, PMD-6; US M14, M16A1, M18; and Indian/British LTM-73, LTM-76.

\(^{40}\) In 1999 Myanmar’s representative to the UN stated that the country was supportive of banning exports of antipersonnel mines, however no formal moratorium or export ban has been proclaimed. See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 469.

\(^{41}\) According to a US cable released by Wikileaks in August 2011, in December 2006 during an interview with US Embassy officials, a Karen politician indicated that “in 2005 a foreign expert trained the KNLA on how to manufacture ‘Bouncing Betty’ anti-personnel mines, packed with ball bearings. The KNLA claims all of its brigades now know how to produce this ‘new’ landmine. KNLA officers claim they use them in forward areas to slow the Burmese Army’s advance into traditional KNU territory. The source said the new mines are much more lethal than earlier KNLA mines that tended to maim rather than kill.” “06RANGOON1767, BURMA REGIME AND KAREN MISTRUST CONTINUES,” US Department of State cable dated 4 December 2006, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011, http://bit.ly/LSLEfX.

\(^{42}\) Landmine Monitor Report 2009 identified the presence of US-made M26 bounding antipersonnel mines in Myanmar, but could not identify the source or the user. In 2010, a confidential source indicated that the KNLA had received many M26 mines from the Royal Thai Army in the past, before Thailand joined the Mine Ban Treaty. See Landmine Monitor Report 2009, p. 1013.

\(^{43}\) About a dozen armed organizations have agreed verbally to cease hostilities with the SPDC (Tatmadaw). Although frequently referred to as “ceasefire groups,” none have signed a formal ceasefire protocol leading to a negotiated settlement. All maintain their arms, including any stockpile of antipersonnel mines.

post-independence struggles for autonomy by ethnic minorities. Some 47 townships in Kachin, Karen (Kayin), Karenni (Kayah), Mon, Rakhine, and Shan states, as well as in Pegu (Bago) and Tenasserim (Tanintharyi) divisions[^45] suffer from some degree of mine contamination, primarily from antipersonnel mines. Karen (Kayin) state and Pegu (Bago) division are suspected to contain the heaviest mine contamination and have the highest number of recorded victims. The Monitor has also received reports of previously unknown suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) in townships on the Indian border of Chin state.[^46]

No estimate exists of the extent of contamination, but the Monitor identified SHAs in the following divisions and townships:

- Karenni state: all seven townships;
- Karen state: all seven townships;
- Kachin state: Mansi, Mogaung, Momauk, Myitkyina, and Waingmaw;
- Mon state: Bilin, Kyai, Mawlamyine, Thanbyuzayat, Thaton, and Ye;
- Pegu division: Kyaukkyi, Shwekyin, Tantabin and Taungoo;
- Rakhine state: Maungdaw;
- Shan state: Hopong, Hsihseng, Langkho, Mawkmai, Mongpan, Mongton, Monghpyak, Namhsan, Tachileik, Nanbkan, Yaksawk, and Ywangan;
- Tenasserim division: Bokpyin, Dawei, Tanintharyi, Thayetchaung and Yebyu; and
- Chin state.

Explosive remnants of war

Myanmar is also affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW), including mortars, grenades, artillery and ordnance dating back to World War II,[^47] but the location or full extent of such contamination is not known. There have been no reports of cluster munition remnants.

Mine Action Program

Myanmar does not have a national mine action program, but as a result of reforms initiated by the government in the past year, ministers have engaged with local and international humanitarian agencies on developing mine action.

The UN Protection working group, chaired by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), created a subgroup focused on the threat of antipersonnel mines in 2009, but in the absence of willingness on the part of the military government to permit any form of mine action this remained inactive. In March 2012, the group decided to reconvene to

[^45]: Myanmar/Burma is divided up into both states and divisions. States are the “home area” of ethnic groups, and are always named after one; other areas, which are not seen as the home area of a specific ethnic group, are called divisions. The ruling military junta changed the name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 and also changed the names of some states. Many ethnic groups within the country and some states still prefer to use the name Burma. Internal state and division names are given in their common form or with the name adopted by the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in parentheses.

[^46]: Research conducted by the Monitor. Data sources included casualty information, sightings of mine warnings, and reports of use by NGOs and other organizations, as well as interviews with field staff and armed forces’ personnel. The survey included casualty data from January 2007 through June 2010 and data from other informants from January 2008 through June 2010.

explore new possibilities for risk education following peace talks between the government and ethnic minority armed groups.\textsuperscript{48}

International demining organizations, including Dan Church Aid (DCA), HALO Trust, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), pursued contacts with the government in 2012 to explore possibilities for conducting survey and clearance, but as of June 2012 had not reached the point of establishing formal programs in Myanmar.\textsuperscript{49}

A proposal by Norway to support resettlement of communities displaced by conflict, including non-technical survey of SHAs, was agreed by Minister of Railways Aung Min in April 2012.\textsuperscript{50} Under that agreement, Norwegian People’s Aid conducted a three-day non-technical assessment of the pilot area of Kuyak Kyi in Bago Division in May 2012 confirming that areas considered for resettlement were affected by mines. As of June 2012, NPA was awaiting permission to conduct a more detailed non-technical survey of the area.\textsuperscript{51} NPA had established an office in Yangon due to be staffed full-time from July 2012 and appointed an operations officer due to take up the post in September 2012.\textsuperscript{52}

The State Minister for Border Affairs, responding to a parliamentary question submitted by an MP from Kayin/Karen State on clearing mines from six villages in his constituency, said in February 2012 that since the six villages were in an area under the control of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the DKBA would remove the mines, but that the Army was available for assistance if requested.\textsuperscript{53}

Mine clearance in 2011

Sporadic mine removal has been reported in recent years by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s army), villagers, and ethnic minority organizations. Child soldiers in the Tatmadaw interviewed in 2011 said that all soldiers were trained to handle mines and that they witnessed many mine casualties in Bago Division and Mon and Shan States.\textsuperscript{54}

The Free Burma Rangers (FBR) include a course on mine identification and emergency clearance procedures for their relief teams. Mines encountered on their missions have either been removed by FBR personnel, who turn them over to anti-government militias, or are removed by militia members.\textsuperscript{55} FBR reported that two Karenni Army soldiers were killed on 2 April 2011 when a mine they had removed detonated, also fatally wounding a member of the FBR.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{48} Landmine Monitor notes of UN Protection Working Group meeting on landmines, Yangon, 24 February 2012; and email from Jeanette Wijnants, Chief, Child Protection Section, UNICEF Myanmar, 12 June 2012.

\textsuperscript{49} Telephone interview with BjarneUssing, Program Manager for Myanmar, DCA, 6 April 2012; and interview with Andreas Indregard, Country Director Myanmar, NPA, in Bangkok, 12 April 2012.

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with Andreas Indregard, NPA, Bangkok, 12 April 2012.

\textsuperscript{51} Telephone interview with Aksel Steen-Nilsen, Program Manager, Myanmar, Norwegian People’s Aid, 21 June 2012.

\textsuperscript{52} Email from and telephone interview with Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, Bangkok, 21 June 2012.

\textsuperscript{53} Interview with Min Aung Lin, Kayin State MP, Hpa-an, Kayin State, 17 February 2012.

\textsuperscript{54} Information provided to the Monitor on condition of anonymity, 27 February 2012.


\textsuperscript{56} FBR, “FBR Karenni Team Member Dies,” FBR Report, 8 April 2011.
“Atrocity” or forced labor demining

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomas Quintana, reported in September 2011 that he had received reports of the “use of civilian porters to carry equipment and walk or drive ox-carts in front of military trucks, to clear for landmines.”

A report documenting forced labor demining by convict porters published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) in July 2011 said one major use of convict labor occurred in January 2011 when the Tatmadaw took an estimated 700 prisoners from 12 prisons and labor camps. The report cited interviews with former porters who escaped to Thailand in 2010–2011, including:

- A former prisoner who estimated that by the time he escaped only 200 of his original group of 800 porters remained, with some 600 escaping, falling ill, being killed by landmines, and ambushed or executed.
- A porter who stated that he had witnessed at least 10 porters step on mines, and said that some died, others lost their legs or eyes and were left where they were injured.
- A former prisoner who described how “All of us were separated: three went to a medical unit, some to carry supplies. Others went into a mine clearance unit. The soldiers had metal detectors, but we were given sticks to check for mines.”
- A former porter who said “Every day we had to walk ahead of the soldiers. They [soldiers] said, “Walk head, go first, there are landmines.” It was our duty, we couldn’t say anything. Sometimes porters were injured by landmines and we carried them back. Other times they were shot.”

Additional detailed reports of villagers forced by the Tatmadaw to clear mines or serve as a human shield against landmines by walking or driving vehicles ahead of soldiers through suspected mined areas were collected by FBR, the KHRG, and the Karen National Union.

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57 The term “atrocity demining” is used by the Monitor to describe forced passage of civilians over mined areas or the forced use of civilians to clear mines without appropriate training or equipment. “Atrocity demining” is sometimes referred to in human rights reports as “human mine sweeping” or “forced labor demining.”


60 Ibid., p. 12.

61 Ibid., p. 31.

62 Ibid., p. 29.

63 Ibid., p. 34.


66 See, for example, “Statement on the Use of Karen Civilians for Forced Labor and as Human Shield by Burma Army,” KNU, 26 May 2011.
Risk Education

Mine/ERW risk education (RE) is inadequate and often non-existent in areas with reported casualties. Very limited activities are carried out in Karen (Kayin) state by the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People, in Karenni (Kayah) state by the Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre, in Shan state by the Lahu Development Union, and in Chin State by the Chin Peoples Action Committee. Throughout 2011 these groups reportedly made presentations reaching about 8,099 people.  

DCA, on behalf of the Ministry of Social Welfare and UNICEF, conducted four RE workshops in the first half of 2012. The first two in February were in Yangon and in Mandalay for township medical and education officials, and NGO staff. DCA held two more workshops in late May and early June, in Taunggyi for staff in southern Shan State and in Lashio for officials from northern Shan State. The second two workshops included officials from the Home Affairs Ministry and the police. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that it provided RE in its training programs for staff working in internally displaced camps in Kachin State in October and November 2011.

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67 Information provided by an international humanitarian agency on the basis of anonymity, 16 May 2012.
68 Telephone interview with Bjarne Ussing, DCA, 6 April 2012; and email from Jeanne Wijnants, UNICEF, Myanmar, 14 June 2012.
69 Email from Jeanne Wijnants, UNICEF, Myanmar, 14 June 2012.
Landmine Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All known casualties by end 2011</th>
<th>3,242 (303 killed; 2,738 injured; 201 unknown) since 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2011</td>
<td>381 (2010: 274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 casualties by outcome</td>
<td>84 killed; 293 injured; 4 unknown (2010: 36 killed; 238 injured)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 casualties by device type</td>
<td>317 antipersonnel mines/IEDs; 15 antivehicle mines; 41 undefined mine; 7 ERW; 1 unknown device</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2011, there were at least 381 new mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Myanmar, based on state and independent media reports as well as information provided by NGOs and other organizations. Of the 2011 total, 207 casualties were civilians and 133 were military; there were 41 for which the civilian status was unknown. At least three boys were injured and 13 casualties were adult women.

Most mines causing casualties were recorded as antipersonnel mines. It has been reported by local risk education providers that victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or “craft” antipersonnel mines are among the mine types causing casualties. People involved in mine and IED incidents are often not able to distinguish between these types of victim-activated explosive items so the type is not recorded.

Past reporting by the Monitor has indicated that there are a significant number of military casualties recorded, but that such records are not generally available to the public. There were no unpublished reports of large scale military casualties in 2011: some 200 were reported in 2010.

The 2011 total represented a significant increase in casualties compared to the 274 from 2010 identified through similar reporting sources. The Monitor casualty data for Myanmar represents an aggregate composition from available sources. However, due to the lack of systematic data collection and varying sources of annual data, reporting is believed not to reflect the full extent of mine/ERW incidents and casualties in the country. As in the past, the data contained insufficient details to distinguish trends or to ensure that the details for all


72 The age and sex of 24 casualties was unknown, one was killed and 23 were injured.


74 See the 2009 edition of the Monitor report for Myanmar, www.the-monitor.org. Unprecedented levels of information on military casualties were received in 2008 from the State Peace and Development Council; 508 military casualties were identified. Information from this source has not been made available any other year.


77 It is possible that available data contains duplicate casualties, but this could not be verified given the limited amount of information provided. Information from one of the sources of casualty data, the state published New Light of Myanmar also reported a slight increase number of reports of mine casualties in Myanmar in 2011. The New Light of Myanmar reported 94 mine casualties in 2011 compared to 80 in 2010.
casualties were correctly recorded. The actual number of casualties is thought to be much higher. The United States (US) Department of State reported that there were up to 600 mine casualties (100 killed, 500 injured) in Myanmar during 2010. In 2012, upon request by the Monitor, the US State Department found that it could not verify this data.

The total number of casualties in Myanmar is unknown. The Monitor has identified 3,242 casualties (303 killed, 2,738 injured, and 201 unknown) between 1999 and the end of 2011.

In addition to human casualties, village livestock and elephants are also affected by landmines in Myanmar. Most elephants killed and injured by mines are those used in the illegal cross-border timber trade. In August 2011, a mine-injured elephant was treated at the Thai Elephant Conservation Center. One elephant died due to a mine injury in October 2011.

### Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Myanmar is unknown, but at least 3,242 survivors have been identified since 1999.

#### Victim Assistance in 2011

In 2011, there was a slight increase in rehabilitation and economic inclusion services available to survivors, both within Myanmar and in the border area in Thailand. Availability of emergency medical services increased along the border with Thailand slightly in 2011, but as in previous years remained extremely limited in conflict-affected areas of Myanmar. Accessibility to rehabilitation services improved in 2011 due to increased geographical coverage of outreach services.

Restrictions remained in force on ICRC assistance for civilians in violence-affected areas along the border. However, in early 2012 an agreement was reached between ICRC and the government of Myanmar to restart ICRC support to the six government-run rehabilitation centers operating without external support since 2007. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) launched a livelihoods program for survivors in some townships in the southeast of the country late in 2011.

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78 In 2010 information on 40 of the 274 casualties identified lacked adequate details for unequivocal verification as unique entries; in 2011, 271 casualties had unique data, while the remainder lacked some details to cross reference such as the date of the incident, or age or sex of the casualty.
80 Interview with Erin Webster-Main, Political Officer, US Embassy, Rangoon, 21 February 2012.
83 Based on 2,445 injured casualties between 1999 and 2010.
84 Email from Cresa Leonard-Pugh, Southeast Asia Resident Manager, CPI, 28 May and 29 June 2012. CPI supported the Karen Department of Health and Welfare to provide emergency services along the border with Thailand, primarily near Tak province.
87 Email from Corinne Beyer, Technical Assistant, UNHCR, 9 April 2012.
In Thailand, most services continued at similar levels to the previous year. However, significantly, more conflict-injured patients, including mine/ERW survivors from Myanmar, received treatment at Thai hospitals with ICRC support in 2011 than in 2010.88

Assessing victim assistance needs

No assessment of survivor needs has been carried out in Myanmar. The Ministry of Health does not disaggregate injuries due to mines/ERW incidents from other traumatic injuries.89 The First Myanmar Basic Disability Survey 2008-2009 was published and released in 2010. The survey covered few mine-affected areas.90

Victim assistance coordination

Myanmar does not have a victim assistance program or strategy. No structure or mechanism was responsible for the coordination and provision of victim assistance services specifically. The Ministry of Health is responsible for disability issues and facilitates rehabilitation while the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement is responsible for vocational training.91

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

No inclusion of survivors in planning victim assistance activities was reported in 2011.

Service accessibility and effectiveness/ Victim assistance activities92

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of organization</th>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Prosthetic centers and two orthopedic hospitals</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Prosthetics provided through three centers</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Socio-economic and rehabilitation services; vocational training school for adults with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown: Statistics not publicly available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shwe Min Tha Foundation</td>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>Covered incidental medical care costs, transportation to medical centers, and food</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

88 Email from Cedric Piralla, Chiang Mai Sub-delegation, ICRC, 6 March 2012.
90 Department of Social Welfare, “First Myanmar Basic Disability Survey 2008-2009,” Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, and the Leprosy Mission International (Myanmar), 2010. This survey is the only survey of disability to have taken place in the country. Not all townships were surveyed, including most of those in conflict affected areas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Back Pack Health Worker Teams (BPHWT)</td>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>Mobile emergency medical service in eastern Myanmar</td>
<td>Decrease in the number of mine victims assisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Free Burma Rangers (FBR)</td>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>Medical care; trained and supported mobile medical teams</td>
<td>Decrease in services provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People</td>
<td>Community-based organization</td>
<td>Prosthetic production at the Kho Kay Prosthetic Clinic, Mutraw, Karen (Kayin) state</td>
<td>Slight increase in prosthetics production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen Health &amp; Welfare Department</td>
<td>Community-based organization</td>
<td>Provided medical first aid assistance and amputative surgeries</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karenni Health Workers Organization</td>
<td>Community-based organization</td>
<td>Provided prosthetics in Loikaw, Kayah (Karenni) state</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR Japan)</td>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>Vocational training; community-based rehabilitation; referral system; survivor rights/advocacy</td>
<td>Decreased number of mine victims in vocational training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC/Myanmar Red Cross</td>
<td>International/national organization</td>
<td>Support to Hpa-an Orthopedic Rehabilitation Centre; prosthetic outreach for remote areas</td>
<td>Increased services to survivors; expanded outreach services; 12% increase in referrals; reached agreement to restart assistance to six government centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Financial assistance for rehabilitation of war victims; economic inclusion through livelihood program</td>
<td>Since mid-2011 some coverage of Kayin and Mon states and Thanintharyi division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No changes to the quality of services provided by the government were reported.

Some New Light of Myanmar reports mention assistance to new mine/ERW casualties and in some cases their hospitalization, although details of the types of assistance provided were not mentioned. In 2011, continued government restrictions imposed on the ICRC prevented it from carrying out assistance activities for civilians in violence-affected areas along the Myanmar-Thailand border. However, discussions between ICRC and government concerning restarting support to six prosthetic centers run by the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Defense led to technical visits in September and October 2011: in early 2012 the ICRC reached an agreement to restart its assistance to the centers.

Myanmar has no laws to ensure the rights of persons with disabilities. The government did not provide social protection for private sector workers who became disabled. However, veterans with disabilities received benefits on a priority basis and non-military persons with

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93 Monitor media scanning for calendar year 2011.
permanent disabilities were also entitled to a benefit payment. There was inadequate state funding for services to assist persons with disabilities. 95 However, in September 2011 the upper house of Parliament approved a proposal for a Disability Rights Law. 96

Within its limited geographical scope, the First Myanmar Basic Disability Survey 2008-2009 found that 85% of persons with disabilities were unemployed and their level of education was far below the national average. 97


Victim assistance activities on Thai-Myanmar Border and in Thailand for Myanmar nationals 98

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of organization</th>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thai hospitals</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Providing medical care to mine/ERW survivors from Myanmar and Cambodia</td>
<td>Provided assistance to more mine-injured than in previous years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosthesis Foundation</td>
<td>National NGO</td>
<td>Prostheses and assistive devices provided free-of-charge</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mae Tao Clinic</td>
<td>National NGO</td>
<td>Prosthetics and rehabilitation services, trauma surgery, and other health services</td>
<td>Increased the number of people who received prostheses by 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shan Health Committee (SHC)</td>
<td>Community-based organization</td>
<td>Prosthetic services in Pang Ma Pha, Wieng Hang, Mae FaLuang, and Loi Kai Wan; and</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


96 “Second regular session of First Amyotha Hluttaw continues for ninth day,” New Light of Myanmar, 2 September 2011, p. 10. It is unclear from the article whether a draft of this law has been written. It has apparently been referred to the Ministry of Social Welfare for action.


98 Interviews with Mayuree Pewsuwan, MSDHS, Sa Kaeo, 7 June 2012; email from Eh Thwa Bor, Mae Tao Clinic, 13 March 2012, and email from Lena Well, International Coordinator, Help without Frontiers Thailand Foundation, 15 and 27 June 2012 (beneficiaries at the Clinic increased from 235 in 2010 to 260 in 2011); email from Karl Förster, Chairman, Between Borders, 17 June 2012. Between Borders no longer supports the SHC, but rather the Shan Education Committee, and handed over all SHC activities to other organizations, namely CPI; email from Cresa Leonard-Pugh, CPI, 28 May and 29 June 2012; email from Kiman Lucas, Executive Director, CPI, 29 June 2012. CPI continued to support many projects or programs it had in previous years but short-term support to some projects along the Thai-Myanmar border ended when PM/WRA funding for 2011-2012 was expended; email from Alexandre Baillat, Thailand Site Coordinator – Mae Sot, Thailand and Cambodia Regional Program, Handicap International, Mae Sot, 29 May 2012; email from Cedric Pirilla, Chiang Mai Sub-delegation, ICRC, 6 March 2012; ICRC, “Annual Report 2010,” Geneva, May 2011, p. 278, and ICRC, “Annual Report 2011,” Geneva, June 2012, p. 251 & 253. ICRC treated 111 weapon-injured patients from Myanmar in 2011, of which 65 were mine/ERW casualties while 49 were treated in 2010. Supplementary information and reporting on other services was received from third-parties requesting anonymity or at meetings with service providers during Monitor field missions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Care Villa established by the Karen Handicap Welfare Association</td>
<td>Community-based organization</td>
<td>Assistance to blind amputee mine/ERW survivors in Mae La refugee camp</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear Path International</td>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>Grants and capacity-building support to community-based organizations for prosthetics and rehabilitation workshops; socio-economic reintegration and micro-credit; emergency services</td>
<td>Slight decrease of socio-economic reintegration and micro-credit services due to a funding shortfall; ended support to Mae La Refugee Camp and for community schools due to funding cuts; added support for emergency services with new funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicap International (HI) Burmese Border Project</td>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>Physiotherapy, prosthetics, and accessibility to buildings; social inclusion activities</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>Covers costs of hospitalization and surgery for war injured people from Myanmar in Thai hospitals</td>
<td>Provided assistance to nearly twice as many mine injured patients compared to 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Support for Mine Action

In 2011, Denmark gave DKK2 million (US$373,587),\textsuperscript{99} the United States (US) gave US$189,106,\textsuperscript{100} and Norway gave NOK625,623 (US$111,675)\textsuperscript{101} for a total of almost $675,000 towards mine action activities in Myanmar.

The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) provided funding to the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) in 2011 to begin projects in several countries, including in Myanmar.\textsuperscript{102} The specific amount allocated for Myanmar, however, is not available.

Summary of contributions in 2007–2011\textsuperscript{103}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>674,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>36,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>779,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,020,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>183,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,694,088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{100} US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2011,” Washington, DC, July 2012.


\textsuperscript{102} Email from Carolin J. Thielking, Directorate for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, European External Action Service, European Commission, 15 April 2012.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.; Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2010; and 30 April 2009; and email from Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, 2 March 2009; and from Hanne B. Elmelund Gam, Head of Humanitarian Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, 21 May 2008.
Cluster Munition ban policy overview

| Convention on Cluster Munitions treaty status | Not a State Party |
| Participation in Convention on Cluster Munition meetings | None in 2011 or early 2012 |

Cluster Munitions

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar[^104] has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Myanmar did not attend any meetings on the Convention on Cluster Munitions or make any statements on cluster munitions in 2011 of the first half of 2012. Previously, in 2010, a government representative informed the Monitor that the legal affairs department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reviewing the convention.[^105] In 2009, a government official informed a regional conference on cluster munitions that while Myanmar has not yet joined the convention it nonetheless, “criticizes the use of such weapons with indiscriminate area effect and which can cause humanitarian consequences.”[^106]

Myanmar attended one regional meeting of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Xieng Khouang, Lao PDR in October 2008) and participated in a regional conference on cluster munitions in Bali, Indonesia in November 2009, where it made its first and to date only public statement on the issue. Myanmar attended the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010 as an observer, but did not make any statement.

Myanmar is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Cluster Munition Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In November 2009 Myanmar stated, “We do not use cluster munitions, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, nor assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under this Convention.”[^107]

[^104]: On 21 October 2010, the ruling military junta announced the change of the country’s name as well as its flag and national anthem. The military regime changed the name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989, but many ethnic groups in the country and a number of states still prefer to use the name Burma.

[^105]: Interview with Aye Thidar Myo, Assistant Director, International Organizations and Economic Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vientiane, 10 November 2010.


[^107]: Ibid.
Reported number of landmine incidents at township level 2011

Data compiled by Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor. This map does not indicate how extensive mine pollution is in any indicated Township.

Data Sources:
Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor

Map ID: MIMU/792v02
Creation Date: 15 June 2012
Projection/Datum: Geographic WGS84

Number of Incidents and casualties by Landmine in 2011

Legend
- Male
- Female
- Unknown
- Incidents

Disclaimer: The names shown and the boundaries used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.